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Interpreting an Unamendable Text 
Thomas W. Merrill* 
“A state without the means of some change is without the means 
of its conservation.” 
                                                                          -Edmund Burke1 
 
Many of the most important legal texts in the United States are 
highly unamendable. This applies not only to the Constitution, which 
has not been amended in over forty years, but also to many framework 
statutes, like the Administrative Procedure Act and the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. The problem is becoming increasingly severe, as political 
polarization makes amendment of these texts even more unlikely. This 
Article considers how interpreters should respond to highly 
unamendable texts. Unamendable texts have a number of pathologies, 
such as excluding the people and their representatives from any direct 
participation in legal change. They also pose an especially difficult 
problem for interpreters, since the interpreter cannot rely on the implicit 
ratification of its efforts that comes about when an enacting body reviews 
and does not amend the efforts of the interpreter. Trapped in a one-sided 
echo chamber, the interpreter will increasingly rely on precedent as a 
source of legitimacy for its interpretive efforts. This, however, introduces 
other pathologies, including second-order unamendability, since the 
interpreter cannot overrule many of its precedents without also calling 
into question its fidelity to law. The Article suggests two interpretive 
strategies as a partial way out of this trap. One is to adopt a general 
“amendability canon” to the effect that disputes should be resolved under 
the more amendable text, when both an unamendable and a relatively 
more amendable source of law are available. The other, paradoxically, 
is to interpret unamendable texts in a Burkean, status-quo oriented 
 
 * Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School. I have benefitted from comments 
on earlier versions of this paper from participants in workshops at Columbia, Cornell, Duke, and 
Virginia law schools and the Princeton political science department. Thanks in particular for 
suggestions from Jessica Bulman-Pozen, John Duffy, Jeffrey Gordon, David Pozen, Sai Prakash, 
Dan Richman, Fred Schauer, Peter Strauss, Keith Whittington, and Ryan Williams. Excellent 
research assistance was provided by Alexander Gross and Bruce Pettig.  
 1. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 19 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1987) (1790). 
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fashion. This will discourage attempts to achieve legal change through 
interpretation of unamendable texts and encourage efforts to achieve 
such change through other means, such as new legislation and 
regulation, which will be inherently more amendable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
All interpretation of legal texts involves an enactor who 
promulgates the text and an interpreter who interprets the text. Often, 
they interact. The enactor promulgates a text, the interpreter interprets 
the text, the enactor responds by amending the text, the interpreter 
interprets the amended text, and so forth. This reciprocal interaction is 
generally healthy. The back-and-forth between the enactor and the 
interpreter provides valuable feedback for both. The enactor, by 
reviewing the issues of interpretation that arise, gains insight into 
which provisions of a text need to be reconsidered or clarified. The 
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interpreter, by observing which interpretations have been overridden, 
gains increased confidence in the interpretations that have been 
allowed to stand. In an ideal world, regular interaction between the 
enactor and the interpreter should strengthen the efforts of both.2 
It is not my purpose here to describe the optimal degree of 
amendability of different texts, from the perspective of ideal system 
design. Presumably, one would want to strike a balance between change 
and stability, between political responsiveness and entrenchment of 
important values. The Constitution, which establishes the general 
framework of government, should be highly stable—that is, somewhat 
difficult to amend. Statutes and regulations that establish fiscal and 
monetary policy should be relatively easy to change, in response to ever-
changing economic conditions. Although I believe that legal change is 
both desirable and inevitable, I make no effort to develop a theory of the 
optimal rate of change here. 
Instead, this Article explores the consequences for 
interpretation when the back-and-forth between enactor and 
interpreter disappears, and the legal text is perceived to be effectively 
unamendable. No legal text is completely immune from change. But 
some are perceived by interpreters as having an extremely low 
probability of amendment. The U.S. Constitution, which is now widely 
declared to be virtually impossible to amend, is the most prominent 
example.3 But there are also a number of important framework 
statutes, such as the Administrative Procedure Act, the Sherman 
Antitrust Act, and the Voting Rights Act, which are widely assumed to 
 
 2. As support for these propositions, I offer the views of three American jurists, none of 
whom are or were reticent about using the judicial office to advance their views of appropriate 
policy. Justice William O. Douglas: “Congress is not omniscient; no matter how careful the 
draftsman, all contingencies cannot possibly be foreseen. . . . That is why constant legislative 
reappraisal of statutes as construed by the courts . . . is a healthy practice.” William O. Douglas, 
Legal Institutions in America, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW: THE CENTENNIAL 
CONFERENCE VOLUME OF THE COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL 292 (Monrad G. Paulsen ed., 1959). Justice 
Anthony M. Kennedy: “Our legal system presumes there will be continuing dialogue among the 
three branches of Government on questions of statutory interpretation and application.” United 
States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 503 (2012). Justice Roger Traynor of the 
California Supreme Court: “[C]ourts and legislatures [have] a symbiotic relationship, each 
drawing on the actions of the other. Legislatures pass[ ] statutes whose applicability to specific 
situations [is] uncertain; courts undert[ake] the applications; legislatures revise[ ] if they [find] a 
specific application offensive.” G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES 
OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 255 (3d ed. 2007).  
 3. See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 319, 319 
(referring to the “virtual impossibility of formal amendment to the Constitution under Article V”); 
Sanford Levinson, How the United States Constitution Contributes to the Democratic Deficit in 
America, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 859, 874 (2007) (noting that amendment of the U.S. Constitution is 
made “almost impossible by the difficulties placed in its path”); Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing 
Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32, 35 (2004) (describing the Constitution as “practically 
unamendable”). 
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be impervious to amendment, at least as to their core provisions.4 
Indeed, a growing list of regulatory statutes, including the major 
federal environmental statutes and the National Labor Relations Act, 
have resisted all attempts at legislative revision in recent years, even 
in the face of dramatic technological and economic changes that would 
seem to cry out for some adjustment.5 Recent empirical studies indicate 
that there has been a pronounced falloff in the number of congressional 
overrides of judicial interpretations of statutes in recent years, with the 
decline especially steep after 1998.6 
The reasons why high-level federal enactments are increasingly 
difficult to amend are both structural and political. Structurally, the 
nation’s top-tier institutions for achieving change in enacted law—
including the constitutional amendment process and the Congress—
suffer from what Neil Komesar calls constraints of scale.7 That is, they 
do not have the ability to expand their output to keep up with the 
demand for legal change. We have eighteenth-century legal institutions 
designed for a simpler era with a much smaller and more homogenous 
population. Constraints of scale mean legal texts that have always been 
difficult to amend become ever-more unamendable, as the finite 
resources available to change legal texts must compete against ever-
growing lists of candidates for change. 
Another and more troubling reason for rising unamendability is 
political polarization. The two major political parties are becoming 
 
 4. The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), originally adopted in 1946, was augmented 
by several amendments in the 1960s and 1970s, but since then, proposed modifications have 
generally failed. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 
90 IND. L.J. 1207, 1234–35 (2015). The Sherman Act, originally adopted in 1890, was substantively 
amended in 1937 only to be restored to its earlier form by subsequent amendment in 1975. See 
Andrew S. Oldham, Sherman’s March (in)to the Sea, 74 TENN. L. REV. 319, 366 n.306 (2007). Key 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act have proven difficult to amend; most recently, in 2006, 
Congress reauthorized the Act without change to the coverage formula that was based on 1960s 
and 1970s election data. See Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 717–718 (2014); see also Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 
2629 (2013) (striking down the coverage formula and observing it was based on facts “having no 
logical relation to the present day”).  
 5. The Clean Air Act has not been significantly amended since 1990, notwithstanding the 
rise of concern over climate change. Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 
163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014). The National Labor Relations Act has defied amendment for seventy 
years, notwithstanding a dramatic decline in private-sector unions. James J. Brudney, Gathering 
Moss: The NLRA’s Resistance to Legislative Change, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 161 (2011). 
 6. Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of 
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1340–41 
(2014). The number of overrides post-1998 falls to about three per year, relative to roughly fifteen 
per year in the 1990s, which the authors term the “golden era” of overrides. Id. at 1332. The 
authors attribute the falloff to acrimony in Congress following the Clinton impeachment. 
 7. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 142–49 (1994). 
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much more differentiated ideologically.8 Ideological polarization makes 
it more difficult to agree on constitutional amendments, which require 
supermajorities in both houses.9 It also makes it more difficult to enact 
ordinary legislation, given the implicit supermajority requirements 
embedded in the legislative process, such as bicameralism, 
presentment, and the Senate’s rules for ending debate. The polarization 
of the parties is mirrored by geographic polarization, with urban areas 
and college towns, especially on the coasts, becoming homogeneously 
Democratic, and areas in between, especially in the South and the Great 
Plains, becoming predominately Republican.10 Geographic polarization 
compounds the problem of unamendability. Clearly, it makes it all the 
more difficult to secure the agreement of three-fourths of the States 
needed for any constitutional amendment. And given the 
overconcentration of Democratic voters in urban areas, with Republican 
voters more disbursed across rural districts, geographic polarization 
increases the probability of prolonged divided government, with 
Republicans more likely to control the House of Representatives and 
Democrats remaining relatively more competitive in races for the 
Senate and the Presidency.11 
As I use the terms, amendable and unamendable refer to the 
probability of override of an interpretation by the enacting body, as 
perceived by an interpreter. The decision rule that governs amendment 
 
 8. See Freeman & Spence, supra note 5, at 14–15, 88–93; Richard L. Hasen, End of 
Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205 (2013); 
Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Politics in 
America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273 (2011). 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring that amendments be proposed by “two thirds of both 
Houses”). An alternative form of proposing amendments, which has not been used, is by 
application of two-thirds of the several states. Id. Under either path, ratification requires the 
assent of three-fourths of the several states. Id. 
 10. BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING 
US APART (2009). Bishop’s depiction of an America sorting itself geographically into rival political 
camps has been challenged by Morris Fiorina and colleagues, who emphasize a broad consensus 
within the electorate about many policy questions. MORRIS P. FIORINA ET AL., CULTURE WAR? THE 
MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA (2006); see also Ryan Stickler, A “Sorted” America? Geographic 
Polarization and Value Overlap in the American Electorate, 97 SOC. SCI. Q. 439, 453 (2016) 
(characterizing Bishop’s thesis as “overblown”). Other political scientists find that partisan 
polarization and sorting have occurred both at the elite level and within the electorate. See, e.g., 
Alan I. Abramowitz, The New American Electorate: Partisan, Sorted, and Polarized, in AMERICAN 
GRIDLOCK: THE SOURCES, CHARACTER AND IMPACT OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION 19–45 (James A. 
Thurber & Antoine Yoshinaka eds., 2015) [hereinafter AMERICAN GRIDLOCK]. But, whether or not 
the ultimate cause is grounded in policy disagreement, there seems to be little denying that 
different regions of the country have differential allegiance to the two dominant political parties, 
hence the familiar identification of “red states” and “blue states.” See, e.g., Ron Johnson et al., The 
Growing Spatial Polarization of Presidential Voting in the United States, 1992–2012: Myth or 
Reality, 49 POL. SCI. & POL. 766 (2016) (finding “clear evidence” that the nation has become more 
spatially polarized, at least in presidential voting). 
 11. See, e.g., Abramowitz, supra note 10, at 41. 
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of the text by the enacting body—simple majority, supermajority, 
double supermajority and so forth—is obviously an important factor in 
determining the perceived probability of override, but it is not the only 
one. A high degree of political polarization within the enacting body is 
also clearly relevant. So too is the degree of veneration with which the 
text is held by the citizenry. This applies particularly to the U.S. 
Constitution, which Thomas Jefferson complained was viewed by some 
“with sanctimonious reverence,” like “the ark of the covenant, too sacred 
to be touched.”12 But the veneration factor may also affect the 
probability of amendment of certain statutes which have endured for a 
long time, and have taken on symbolic importance, like the Sherman 
Antitrust Act and the Voting Rights Act. 
As a descriptive matter, I argue that when there is little or no 
prospect of amendment, the interpreter will increasingly substitute 
analysis of precedent interpreting the text for interpretation of the text 
itself. In effect, the process of interpretation is transformed into a 
species of common law incrementalism.13 One obvious reason is that an 
unamendable text often accumulates a large body of interpretive 
precedent, which is more on point and accessible to interpreters than is 
evidence about the meaning of the text itself. Another, and less obvious 
reason, is that once the interpreter is cut off from any constructive 
interaction with the enacting body, the interpreter cannot rely on 
implicit ratification of its interpretive efforts when the enactor leaves 
its interpretations undisturbed. Justifying outcomes in terms of 
precedent thus becomes a substitute for enforcing the will of the 
enacting body, in an effort to preserve the authority of the interpreter. 
As interpretation evolves into common law incrementalism, the 
consequences for the interpreter are both constraining and liberating. 
The process is constraining because most precedent is entrenched and 
cannot be overruled without undermining the impression that the 
interpreter is bound by law. Thus, it will be difficult to revisit most 
interpretations—no matter how erroneous they come to seem. It is 
liberating insofar as the common law system permits elaborations and 
qualifications on what has been previously decided. Thus, insofar as the 
outcome can be framed as an interpretation of interpretive precedent, 
interpreters are free to advance their policy preferences. If the policy 
preferences of interpreters are sufficiently heterogeneous, the process 
 
 12. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 9 (1988) (quoting Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Samuel Kerchival (July 12, 1816)). 
 13. By this I mean that individual controversies are resolved by reasoning from prior 
precedent rather than by interpreting the language of the text. For recognition of the dominance 
of common law incrementalism in constitutional law, see generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING 
CONSTITUTION (2010). 
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can proceed for some time with high levels of public approval. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has devolved into two blocks of 
Justices, whose preferences are strongly correlated with the political 
party that appointed them.14 The result is a widespread perception 
that, within the policy space left by the system of precedent, it has 
become a “political court.”15 If this perception persists, it is a fair 
concern that it will eventually undermine the Court’s standing with the 
public and compromise its ability to command obedience to its 
interpretations of federal law.16 
Fortunately, we are not trapped in a world in which the only 
option is extreme stasis in enacted law, with change relegated to 
marginal adjustments by interpreters tweaking precedents. We have a 
variety of options for generating legal policy, many of which are more 
amendable than the Constitution and framework federal statutes. New 
rights regimes, like protection for the aged and the disabled, can be 
adopted as statutes rather than constitutional amendments, making 
them relatively more amendable in light of experience. Congress can 
delegate broad policy discretion to administrative agencies, which 
automatically makes policy more amendable than if it is hard-wired 
into a statute. Legal issues involving social policy can be left to state 
and local governments, where they are more susceptible to revision 
than if decreed by the federal government. And administrative agencies 
at both the federal and state level can make policy using instruments 
having different degrees of amendability. Still, the extreme 
unamendability of the Constitution and many important framework 
statutes is cause for great concern. Enough to warrant a new look at the 
implications of amendability for norms of legal interpretation. 
 
 14. Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the 
Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301. 
 15. Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 39 (2005).  
 16. See, e.g., Vanessa A. Baird & Amy Gangl, Shattering the Myth of Legality: The Impact of 
the Media’s Framing of Supreme Court Procedures on Perceptions of Fairness, 27 POL. PSYCHOL. 
597, 607 (2006) (“[O]ur results suggest that perceptions of fairness are adversely affected when 
people receive information about a politically charged Court, indicating a likely decline in public 
support for the institution if citizens came to see judicial deliberations to be . . . politically 
driven . . . .”); Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, Political Justice? Perceptions of 
Politicization and Public Preferences Toward the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 76 PUB. 
OPINION Q. 105, 113 (2012) (noting that “[t]o the degree . . . the process . . . becomes more visibly 
politicized, we should expect citizens’ differentiation of the Court from the explicitly political 
branches to decrease, leading to even further politicization”); Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. 
Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 659–60 
(1992) (“To the extent that the Court becomes politicized or perceived as such, it risks cutting itself 
off from its natural reservoir of goodwill and may become reliant for basic institutional support on 
those who profit from its policies. This is a risky position for any institution to adopt.”). For recent 
evidence that the public increasingly perceives the judiciary as afflicted by political bias, see S.I. 
Strong’s book review, How Legal Academics Can Participate in Judicial Education: A How-to 
Guide by Richard Posner, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 421, 422 n.5 (2017).  
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The normative theory I develop argues that courts and other 
tribunals confronted with a highly unamendable text should try, where 
possible, to shift legal policymaking toward texts that are relatively 
more amendable. Obviously, there are limits to how far any interpreter 
can nudge the legal system toward the use of more amendable sources.17 
And the basic structure of government established by the Constitution 
and the institutional choices reflected in framework statutes cannot be 
interpreted away. Nevertheless, I argue that there are two general 
interpretive strategies that would assist in moving the structure of 
government in the direction of greater amendability. The first is to 
embrace a general “amendability canon” favoring the resolution of 
disputes in accordance with the more amendable text, whenever two or 
more texts are available as a source of authority. The second is to 
embrace a Burkean approach to the interpretation of unamendable 
texts, meaning that such texts would be interpreted in accordance with 
their established or settled understanding, as opposed to either their 
original meaning or a meaning the interpreter thinks would produce a 
better or more just outcome. 
These proposals seem paradoxical at first: If texts cannot be 
amended, it would seem perhaps that they should be regularly 
“updated” through interpretation. But avoiding reliance on 
unamendable texts and interpreting unamendable texts to conform to 
the legal status quo will reduce the returns to interest groups from 
seeking legal change through interpretation of unamendable texts. 
This, in turn, will cause such groups to redirect their energies toward 
obtaining legal change through other avenues, which will nearly always 
mean that the change will be embodied in a relatively more amendable 
form. Thus, over time, increasing reliance on amendable texts and a 
status-quo oriented mode of interpretation of unamendable texts will 
tend to shift the locus of legal authority away from unamendable toward 
more amendable texts, which should produce a legal system more 
receptive to give-and-take between enactor and interpreter. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I offers an overview of why 
unamendable texts are problematic, both from the vantage of the 
development of public policy and from the perspective of interpreters. 
Part II develops a descriptive account of how interpreters are likely to 
respond to different texts, depending on their perception of the 
probability of amendment. I argue here that interpreters will be aware 
of, and will adjust their interpretive behavior in response to, texts that 
 
 17. Cf. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 120 (2006) (emphasizing the lack 
of realism in any proposal that requires “some threshold or critical mass of coordinated judicial 
action to provoke desirable legislative reactions”). 
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are either highly amendable or highly unamendable. Texts with a 
modest, but not an especially high or low probability of amendment, will 
likely elicit what we think of as ordinary textual interpretation: 
analysis of the meaning of the words, the context in which the words 
appear, and various canons of interpretation. Part III develops the 
normative argument that interpreters faced with highly unamendable 
texts should strive to displace reliance on such texts as much as 
possible, in an effort to push public policy in the direction of relatively 
more amendable enactments. 
I. WHY UNAMENDABLE TEXTS ARE PROBLEMATIC 
Before turning to questions about the relationship between 
interpretation and the amendability of texts, it is worth briefly 
considering some of the reasons why highly unamendable legal texts 
are problematic. This is relevant both in considering how interpreters 
are likely to respond to such texts, and as a normative matter how 
interpreters should respond to such texts. 
Unamendable texts have several serious disadvantages not 
shared by amendable texts. One obvious problem goes by the name 
“dead hand control.”18 Over time, new technologies emerge, wealth and 
population grow, and social and political values change. The concerns 
that motivated the enacting body are likely to become increasingly 
obsolete. Amendable texts can be modified to accommodate these 
changes. Unamendable texts raise the prospect that the living will 
increasingly find their aspirations frustrated by the concerns of those 
who lived long ago. Parts of the unamendable text may be sufficiently 
vague that updating through interpretation is possible. But nearly all 
texts contain at least some rule-like provisions that defy change 
through interpretation.19 As time marches on, some of these provisions 
 
 18. Thomas Jefferson is usually cited as the original source for this concern. As he wrote to 
Madison, “ ‘[T]he earth belongs in usufruct to the living’ . . . the dead have neither powers nor rights 
over it.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 392 (Julian Boyd ed., 1958); see also ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA 167–71 (1990); Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some 
Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 152, 164–69 (Larry 
Alexander ed., 1998). See generally Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 169, 192–202 (2008) (arguing that the case for enforcing the original 
meaning of enactments based on democracy cannot be sustained for provisions more than one 
hundred years old); Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 606 (2008) (examining the relationship between arguments about dead hand 
control and theories of constitutional interpretation). 
 19. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 42 (2011) (noting that the Constitution 
contains many specific rules that have a plain meaning); Dixon, supra note 3, at 320. For evidence 
that the Court tends to apply originalist methods in cases involving constitutional rules, but not 
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may become increasingly questionable. Why must every state have two 
senators? Why must all civil controversies involving twenty dollars or 
more be tried by juries?20 Other provisions establish institutions, 
impose limits on eligibility for office, or allocate powers in ways that 
cannot be plausibly interpreted away. Do we really need the Electoral 
College? Why must the president be a natural born citizen? Why should 
the residents of the District of Columbia be deprived of representation 
in Congress?21 
Another disadvantage of unamendable texts is that they 
impoverish the information needed to develop public policy under 
conditions of uncertainty. The back-and-forth made possible by an 
amendable text allows two different institutions, with very different 
capacities and perspectives, to weigh in sequentially on the evolution of 
public policy, after observing the work product of the other. The result 
is likely to be better policy than if either were to act alone. This could 
be either because many minds consider the problem from different 
perspectives,22 or because the process allows for experimentation with 
different approaches followed by assessment of the results.23 Both 
explanations reflect an appropriate degree of epistemological modesty 
about social policy. Determining the right answer is not a matter of 
discovering immutable truths, but drawing on disbursed information to 
produce incremental adjustments.24 
Perhaps most importantly, an unamendable text inevitably 
drains authority away from the people. Forget the debate about 
whether honoring the intentions of a long-dead enactor is or is not 
consistent with popular sovereignty.25 If a text is unamendable, the 
people will be cut out of any strong influence over what the law will be 
in the future. The authority to achieve legal change will be relocated 
away from the process of enactment and amendment of texts—
 
in cases involving constitutional standards, see Jamal Greene, Rule Originalism, 116 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1639, 1658–80 (2016). 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1; id. amend. VII.  
 21. Id. art. II, § 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (authorizing creation of a “district” 
to serve as the seat of national government and differentiating it from a state). 
 22. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 163–86 (2008) (comparing, from 
a many-minds perspective, formal constitutional amendment relative to judicial interpretation of 
the Constitution). 
 23. There is an extensive and growing literature, sometimes called new governance theory, 
on the importance of adaptability in the development of regulatory policy. See, e.g., Charles F. 
Sable & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 
GEO. L.J. 53 (2011). 
 24. On these grounds, Ozan Varol has argued that there is wisdom in adopting temporary 
constitutions, which can be revised in light of experience and reduce the “error costs” of durable 
constitutions. Ozan O. Varol, Temporary Constitutions, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 409, 421–27 (2014). 
 25. For discussion, see KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW chs. 4–5 (1999); Primus, supra note 18.  
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something over which the people have at least an indirect say through 
elections of representatives—and given over to the interpreters, who 
typically are not elected and once chosen are largely immune from 
removal from office. And given their relative isolation from public 
oversight, the interpreters are more likely to respond to elite opinion, 
rather than public opinion.26 Any system of government that claims to 
rest on the authority of “We the People” should be dismayed by the 
prospect that its most important laws are unamendable.27 
Against these disadvantages, one might think that a highly 
unamendable text would at least enhance the stability of a legal system, 
promoting reliance on the values enshrined in a text impervious to 
formal change. In fact, recent empirical studies by comparative 
constitutional law scholars suggest the opposite may be true. Highly 
unamendable constitutions have a significantly shorter life expectancy 
than ones that are relatively more amendable.28 Drawing upon both 
international comparisons and studies of the constitutions of the fifty 
states,29 these scholars conclude that longevity and amendability form 
an inverted “U” curve, with constitutions that are very easy to amend 
and those that are very difficult to amend having significantly shorter 
life spans than those in the middle. The United States, which has the 
 
 26. For evidence that the Supreme Court is more influenced by elite opinion than by popular 
opinion, see Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the 
American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1566–80 (2010); Richard Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a 
“Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103. 
 27. The perception that constitutional law has become the exclusive province of courts and 
that this is in fundamental tension with our basic commitment to democracy animates a large 
literature on what is called “democratic constitutionalism.” See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE 
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Robert Post & 
Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1027 (2004). For a useful overview and synthesis, see David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as 
Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2053–64 (2010). Democratic 
constitutionalism, in its various forms, seeks to maintain the hegemony of constitutional law 
relative to ordinary legislation and administrative action but somehow inject more popular 
participation into its formulation. The proposal here, in contrast, is to de-emphasize constitutional 
law and other types of highly unamendable law, at least as sources of legal change, and to place 
greater emphasis on relatively more amendable forms of law, which will be subject to greater 
democratic influence. For a relatively unusual effort within the literature on democratic 
constitutionalism to identify an institutional innovation that would promote more amendability, 
see Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe & David Singh Grewal, Make Me Democratic, but Not yet: Sunrise 
Lawmaking and Democratic Constitutionalism, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1975, 1998 (2016). 
 28. ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONS 140 (2009).  
 29. For international comparative studies, in addition to ELKINS ET AL., id., see AREND 
LIJPHART, PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY 216–31 (1999); Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of 
Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) [hereinafter RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION]. Lutz also relies on a comparative analysis of U.S. state constitutions. Id.; see also 
Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1641, 1666–68 (2014). 
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oldest continuing constitution and the one that is perhaps the most 
difficult to amend,30 is a major anomaly here. By the law of averages, 
the U.S. Constitution should have lasted about thirteen years.31 
As comparative constitutional scholars also observe, the more 
difficult it is to amend a constitution, the more likely it is that 
alternative mechanisms of change will come to the fore.32 These include, 
perhaps most frequently, overthrowing the constitution and adopting a 
new one, or simply ignoring the constitution.33 Another hypothesized 
means of achieving constitutional change—and the one directly 
relevant to the topic of this Article—is through judicial interpretation. 
Indeed, it is commonly asserted that revisionist interpretation of the 
U.S. Constitution is what has allowed this document to remain in effect, 
though amended only infrequently, for almost 230 years.34 
Yet there are serious limitations to securing change through 
interpretation. Change through interpretation is not always possible. 
Sometimes the text incorporates a rule as opposed to a standard.35 
Other issues will evade review because no one has standing or the issue 
is regarded as a political question unfit for judicial resolution.36 
Moreover, this mode of change must be mediated through legal 
arguments pitched to interpreters, which necessarily precludes many 
 
 30. See LIJPHART, supra note 29, at 222 (describing the U.S. Constitution as having the “least 
flexible” amendment procedure of thirty-six democratic nations studied). 
 31. See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 28, at 140 tbl.6.4 (showing predicted life expectancy of 
constitutions at thirteen years as the difficulty of amendment approaches the maximum); see also 
Lutz, supra note 29, at 262 tbl.14 (showing average duration of national constitutions as thirty-
seven years with an amendment difficulty of 3.01 or higher); id. at 257 (computing the degree of 
difficulty of amending the U.S. Constitution as 5.80). One can argue that the durability of the U.S. 
Constitution is due to it being a uniquely good constitution. See JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. 
RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013). Something other than the salutary 
features of the text must be at work in accounting for its durability, however, since the U.S. 
Constitution was widely copied in Latin America in the nineteenth century, and nearly all the 
imitations have disappeared. ELKINS ET AL., supra note 28, at 25. 
 32. See, e.g., Lutz, supra note 29, at 245 (“A low amendment rate associated with a long 
average constitutional duration strongly implies the use of some alternative means of revision to 
supplement the formal amendment process.”). 
 33. ELKINS ET AL., supra note 28, at 56.  
 34. See, e.g., LIJPHART, supra note 29, at 229 (classifying the United States as combining the 
highest degree of constitutional rigidity with the greatest degree of activist judicial review); id. at 
265 (suggesting that the inordinate difficulty of amending the U.S. Constitution “led to an 
unusually (and some would undoubtedly say ‘inordinately’) heavy reliance on innovative judicial 
interpretation”); Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 29, at 1702. 
 35. Dixon, supra note 3, at 320. Numerical thresholds, such as the minimum age requirement 
for the president, the number of senators from each state, and the right to trial by jury in federal 
civil cases involving more than twenty dollars, are clear examples of rules that defy change 
through interpretation. 
 36. For an overview of standing requirements and other limits on justiciability, see RICHARD 
H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
49–266 (7th ed. 2015). 
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types of considerations supporting or opposing change. To be sure, there 
may be indirect forms of feedback that influence interpreters. The 
interpreter’s efforts may be subject to criticism by academics, editorial 
writers, and political figures, and the interpreter may be subject to 
various threats such as court packing, loss of jurisdiction, and so forth.37 
But these indirect feedback mechanisms are highly imperfect.38 They 
do not require any constructive participation by the enacting body in 
the development of policy. They can also backfire, at least in the short 
term, if the interpreter perceives the feedback as attempted 
intimidation. This may cause the interpreter to dig in its heels in order 
to maintain a reputation for independence and consistency.39 
Perhaps most seriously, change through interpretation of 
unamendable texts generates its own second-order form of 
unamendability. This is because of the problem of legitimacy facing the 
interpreter when the back-and-forth with the enactor shuts down. Once 
the text comes to be perceived as effectively unamendable, the 
interpreter increasingly runs the danger of being identified as a 
usurping lawgiver rather than an interpreter. As we will see in the next 
Part, the interpreter trapped in such a situation is likely to fall back on 
precedent interpreting the text as the source of authority for its 
decisions—because decision according to precedent is regarded as a 
form of law-constrained behavior. Textual interpretation gives way to 
common law incrementalism. This mode of interpretation, however, 
places a large brake on the prospects of achieving change through 
interpretation, if only because precedents must be followed by the 
interpreter if the interpreter has any hope that they will be respected 
by other actors.40 
As precedent piles up particularizing the generalities found in 
the unamendable text, the prospect for change through interpretation 
may dim even further, if pervasive doubts about the legitimacy of the 
 
 37. The U.S. Supreme Court is occasionally claimed to be an instrument of popular opinion 
based on the existence of these sorts of indirect feedback mechanisms. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE 
WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED 
THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
 38. Like the possibility of amendment, the prospect of adopting jurisdiction-stripping 
measures and other forms of congressional retaliation may have receded in recent years with the 
increasing ideological polarization of Congress. In this environment, members of Congress may be 
primarily interested in making symbolic statements that resonate with their respective electoral 
bases, rather than enacting legislation that limits the authority of the Supreme Court. See Neal 
Devins, Should the Supreme Court Fear Congress?, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (2006). 
 39. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(“[T]o overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed 
decision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious question.”). 
 40. See id. at 866 (noting that “frequent overruling would overtax the country’s belief in the 
Court’s good faith”).  
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interpreter’s exegesis of the text result in agitation to return to the 
text’s “original meaning.”41 Commentators hostile to current doctrine 
will have little difficulty pointing out that the law as reflected in the 
body of interpretation differs from what the enacting body intended or 
understood.42 The only commands that deserve the appellation “law,” 
the critics will insist, are the ones that were adopted by the enactors.43 
From this perspective, common law incrementalism begins to look more 
and more like a shaky tower on a weak base.44 To the extent this 
perspective takes hold—and there is evidence it is taking hold45—the 
process of interpretation will introduce a further inhibition on the 
prospects for legal change. 
The sclerotic effect of a precedent-based gloss on the 
Constitution or framework statutes is obscured by the emphasis of legal 
theorists on certain dramatic shifts in interpretation by the Supreme 
Court, such as the repudiation of Plessy v. Ferguson by Brown v. Board 
of Education,46 the retrenchment from the liberty of contract regime 
associated with Lochner v. New York,47 or the overruling of Bowers v. 
Hardwick in Lawrence v. Texas.48 But this ignores the stickiness of 
doctrine in most areas of public law, where overruling is rare and past 
 
 41. For a compendium of sources on the emergence of the originalism movement, see 
ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007). 
 42. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1231 (1994) (documenting the various ways in which the modern administrative state is 
inconsistent with the original understanding of the Constitution); Jonathan F. Mitchell, 
Textualism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1237, 1237 (2017) (arguing that 
modern equal protection jurisprudence is inconsistent with the text of the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
 43. See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
23 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. 
COMMENT. 289 (2005). 
 44. Comparative constitutional law scholars observe that “the fixation on a constitution’s 
original meaning is almost uniquely American. Foreign constitutional authors and interpreters do 
not generally share the American obsession with the stability of the original text and its meaning.” 
Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 29, at 1669. This American “obsession,” I would argue, is directly 
attributable to the unamendability of the Constitution and the growing sense that the burgeoning 
common law exegesis on the document lacks the legitimacy of the original document. 
 45. I would cite the proliferating efforts of scholars to justify significant judicial revisions in 
constitutional law as being consistent with originalism. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 19 (arguing 
that vague constitutional provisions like the Equal Protection Clause were originally understood 
to require interpretation in the manner of a “living” constitution); ROBERT W. BENNETT & 
LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 152, 154–55 (2011) (restating the 
views of Professor Solum that originalism properly understood leaves large room for “construction” 
of abstract, general, and vague language consistent with a variety of approaches that permit 
judicial updating); William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2359 
(2015) (defining originalism as including a commitment to interpretation through evolving 
precedent). 
 46. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954). 
 47. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  
 48. 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003). 
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precedents cannot always be distinguished in ways that allow for basic 
course corrections. Some examples include: (1) the narrow 
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases, which has never been 
revisited (notwithstanding persistent academic criticism);49 (2) the 
approval in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States of for-cause 
limitations on presidential removal of the heads of independent 
agencies, which continues to be followed although it undermines the 
most plausible instrument of presidential control over a significant 
portion of the administrative state;50 (3) the imposition of mandatory 
warnings for criminal suspects as a prophylactic rule in Miranda v. 
Arizona, followed by the insistence that the decision was based on the 
Court’s authority to interpret the Constitution and cannot be revised 
legislatively;51 (4) the adoption in Buckley v. Valeo of the distinction 
between expenditures and contributions for purposes of assessing the 
constitutionality of campaign finance laws, which has shaped all 
subsequent decisions and has arguably made rational campaign finance 
regulation impossible;52 and (5) the decision in City of Philadelphia v. 
New Jersey that garbage disposal is subject to the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, which has invalidated nearly all subsequent attempts to 
 
 49. 83 U.S. 36 (1872); see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758 (2010) (refusing to 
reconsider the Slaughter-House Cases’ holding); Akhil Reed Amar, Substance and Method in the 
Year 2000, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 601, 631 n.178 (2001) (noting widespread scholarly agreement that 
the Slaughter-House Cases do not present “a plausible reading of the Amendment”). 
 50. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). Humphrey’s Executor, which involved the commissioner of an 
independent agency, was extended to an (assertedly) inferior executive officer in Morrison v. Olson, 
487 U.S. 654, 709 (1988). The Court appeared to have second thoughts about the wisdom of 
creating executive officers insulated from presidential control in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public 
Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010), but rather than overrule Humphrey’s 
Executor and Morrison—which would entail repudiating precedent—it adopted the rather silly 
rule that the Constitution prohibits two layers of for-cause protection for executive officers. On 
why presidential authority to remove principal officers at-will makes more sense as a device for 
assuring accountability to the president throughout the executive branch, see Neomi Rao, 
Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1205 (2014). 
 51. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). When presented with a challenge to the 
precedent based on a subsequent congressional enactment, the Court upgraded the prophylactic 
rule to a constitutional command in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).  
 52. 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976); see, e.g., Anthony J. Gaughan, The Forty-Year War on Money in 
Politics: Watergate, FECA, and the Future of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 791, 792 
(2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court has barred Congress from acting on popular support for 
comprehensive reform of the system . . . [because] the Buckley ruling prohibits Congress from 
establishing limits on overall campaign spending . . . .”); Burt Neuborne, One Dollar–One Vote: A 
Preface to Debating Campaign Finance Reform, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 32–39 (1997) (describing the 
practical difficulties for campaign finance reform engendered by Buckley’s expenditures-
contributions distinction). 
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require recycling of waste at its source.53 The list could be extended 
indefinitely. 
The fundamental weakness of updating an unamendable text 
through interpretation is captured by Justice Scalia’s metaphor of the 
common law as a Scrabble Board: “No rule of decision previously 
announced [can] be erased, but qualifications [can] be added to it.”54 
Because previous decisional rules ordinarily cannot be erased—no 
matter how erroneous they come to seem—they are locked in. Yet at the 
same time, the system permits elaborations and qualifications on what 
has been previously decided. So interpreters are free to advance their 
policy preferences, insofar as they can be framed as “qualifications” to 
the existing body of precedent. If the policy preferences of interpreters 
come to be strongly correlated with the political party that appointed 
them—as has happened in recent years—then the interpreter will be 
condemned as a “political court,”55 even if the decisional space in which 
it operates is highly constrained. The net result is the worst of both 
worlds as a mechanism for change: the options for change are highly 
limited and yet the change agent is increasingly vulnerable to charges 
of illegitimacy.56 How long such a system can persist is an open 
question. 
II. HOW INTERPRETERS RESPOND TO PERCEPTIONS OF AMENDABILITY 
In this Part, I consider what interpreters are likely to know 
about the amendability of different enacted texts and how they are 
likely to react to these perceptions when called upon to interpret the 
text. What follows does not purport to be a complete theory of 
interpretive behavior. Obviously, many factors influence the way 
interpreters construe legal texts, including the legal norms or 
conventions that govern the interpretational process. Instead, I will 
isolate one variable—the interpreter’s perception of the probability of 
override of the interpretation by the enacting body—that has rarely 
 
 53. 437 U.S. 617 (1978); see C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389–95 
(1994) (following Philadelphia and invalidating a town ordinance that directed waste flow to a 
local transfer station); Dan T. Coenen, Where United Haulers Might Take Us: The Future of the 
State-Self-Promotion Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause Rule, 95 IOWA L. REV. 541, 548 
n.32 (2010) (citing cases decided after Carbone, most of which resulted in invalidation of challenged 
ordinances); Sidney M. Wolf, The Solid Waste Crisis: Flow Control and the Commerce Clause, 39 
S.D. L. REV. 529, 533 (1994) (noting, on the eve of the Carbone decision, that courts following 
Philadelphia “invariably invalidate flow control” ordinances). 
 54. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 8 (1997). 
 55. Posner, supra note 15, at 76–77.  
 56. See supra note 13. 
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been factored into previous accounts seeking to explain the interpretive 
process.57 I conclude that perceived amendability will directly influence 
the interpretive process only in extreme cases—where the 
interpretation is perceived to be either highly likely or highly unlikely 
to be amended. Given that the U.S. Constitution and many important 
federal statutes are now highly unlikely to be amended, it is likely that 
the interpretive process will be significantly affected by the remote 
prospect of override by the enacting body. 
A. Sources of Perceived Amendability 
There are four sources of information that plausibly allow 
interpreters to form judgments about the probability of amendment of 
a text they are charged with interpreting: the procedural difficulty of 
securing an amendment of the text, the historical probability of 
securing an amendment of the type of text in question, the length of 
time the specific text has remained unamended, and other cultural 
knowledge about the propriety of amending the particular type of text 
in question. 
1. Procedural Barriers to Amendment 
The first source of information is the procedural difficulty of 
securing an amendment of the text. The procedural barriers to 
amendment range from very low (high probability of amendment) to 
extremely high (low probability of amendment). The full range of 
possibilities is easier to see if we include administrative texts along with 
statutes and constitutional provisions. 
The most easily amended legal texts are probably “guidance” 
materials issued by administrative agencies such as a press release or 
agency enforcement manual.58 There are no formal procedures for 
issuing such guidance. If an interpreter construes one of these 
pronouncements in a way the agency dislikes, it is relatively easy to 
issue a clarifying statement that effectively amends the original 
guidance document. Likewise, executive orders of the president are 
easy to amend—the president, or the president’s immediate successor, 
 
 57. The principal exceptions are various strategic actor or “separation of powers game” 
theories that posit courts interpret statutes with an eye to the likely legislative response. See, e.g., 
LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 138–57 (1998); John A. Ferejohn & 
Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 263 
(1992). As noted below, these theories founder in all but the most extreme cases of amendability 
or unamendability because of the low probability of legislative override.  
 58. See Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1466–68 (1992). 
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merely has to sign a new executive order superseding or amending the 
old one.59 
Moving up the ladder of procedural difficulty a notch, we 
encounter agency pronouncements set forth in policy statements or 
interpretive rules published in the Federal Register or embodied in an 
adjudicative order released by the agency.60 It is somewhat more 
difficult to amend these texts. Amending a policy statement or 
interpretive rule published in the Federal Register requires a further 
publication in the Federal Register.61 Clarifying or overruling a 
pronouncement contained in an adjudicative order will probably require 
issuing a pronouncement in a subsequent adjudication, or possibly 
issuing a legislative rule. 
Advancing further along the procedural spectrum, we come to 
agency rules having the force of law. Such a rule can be amended only 
by issuing another rule having the force of law,62 which ordinarily 
means engaging in notice-and-comment procedures as required by the 
APA, publication of the new rule in the Federal Register, and waiting 
the minimum time for the new rule to take effect.63 This is clearly the 
most procedurally difficult form of administrative amendment. 
When we turn to legislation, the procedural hurdles to 
amendment become significantly higher. Enacting a federal law 
requires the concurrence of the House and Senate to the same text, and 
either the agreement of the president or a two-thirds vote of each 
chamber overriding the president’s veto. This has rightly been 
described as functionally equivalent to a supermajority voting rule.64 In 
recent years, legislative amendment has become even more difficult 
 
 59. See KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2001).  
 60. See generally Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring 
Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803 (2001). 
 61. Compare 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(1)(D)–(E) (2012) (amendments of “statements of general 
policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency” must be 
published in the Federal Register), with 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(B) (statements of policy and 
interpretation not published in the Federal Register must be made available for public inspection 
and copying). 
 62. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206 (2015) (finding agencies must “use 
the same procedures when they amend or repeal a rule as they used to issue the rule in the first 
instance”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (defining “rule making” to include “amending” or “repealing” 
a rule). 
 63. 5 U.S.C. § 553.  
 64. E.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 
TEX. L. REV. 703, 773–74 (2002).  
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because of the need in many cases to obtain the vote of sixty senators to 
end debate on a proposed measure.65 
The U.S. Constitution, on any account, falls far toward the high-
difficulty end of the spectrum. Indeed, the U.S. Constitution, on the 
conventional view, is “unusually, and probably excessively, difficult to 
amend.”66 The principal procedure for amendment, set forth in Article 
V, requires an affirmative two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress 
and ratification by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states.67 
According to one study, the only national constitution more difficult to 
amend than the U.S. Constitution was the Constitution of Yugoslavia 
adopted in 1946, which of course no longer exists.68 
The ultimate in unamendability in the U.S. context, which is 
unique, is the provision of Article V that says no state, without its 
consent, can be deprived of its equal representation in the Senate.69 
Absent unanimous consent, the only way to amend this provision, 
presumably, would be a revolution overturning the entire 
Constitution.70 
2. Historical Incidence of Amendment of the Type of Text in Question 
A second source of data that interpreters can take into account 
in predicting the ease of amendment, without regard to the procedural 
difficulty of amendment, is the actual rate of amendment of the type of 
 
 65. See VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 27, 57, 66 (2016) 
(highlighting the significance of Senate Rule 22 in reinforcing the supermajority barriers to the 
enactment of federal legislation).  
 66. Lutz, supra note 29, at 265.  
 67. U.S. CONST. art. V.  
 68. Lutz, supra note 29, at 261 tbl.11.  
 69. U.S. CONST. art. V (setting forth the procedures for amending the Constitution and then 
stating, “Provided . . . that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in 
the Senate”). Conceivably, one could use two amendments: the first amending the Article V 
requirement of unanimous consent and the second amending Article I to require the Senate to be 
apportioned on the basis of population. This, of course, would subvert the plain intention of Article 
V. Some foreign constitutions, such as the German Basic Law, make certain rights explicitly 
unamendable. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 79(3), translation at Basic Law of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, GESETZE IM INTERNET, http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2018) [https://perma.cc/TP69-BQHF] 
(prohibiting amendment of select provisions of the constitution, including the bill of rights). 
 70. I will not pursue the question whether it is meaningful to speak of amendment of 
authoritative texts outside the formal channels of amendment, such as Article V in the case of the 
Constitution, or the procedures for enacting a law under Article I, Section 7 in the case of a federal 
statute. I accept the view, which is conventional in legal circles, that amendment of the text is 
secured only through the designated formal process. Compare BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); and Akhil 
Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. 457 (1994), with David R. Dow, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION, supra note 29, at 117.  
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legal text at issue. There are no published data of which I am aware 
estimating the frequency with which administrative interpretations are 
overridden by higher administrative authority. One gets the impression 
this happens with some regularity, but there are no empirics backing 
this up. 
Recent scholarship has supplied us with some data about the 
frequency of amendment of state constitutions. On average, state 
constitutions are either replaced or revised by amendment roughly 
every three years.71 This is a rate of revision far higher than exists for 
the federal Constitution. Moreover, a significant portion of these 
amendments are designed to override judicial interpretations of the 
state constitution.72 There are evidently no data dealing with the 
frequency of state legislative overrides of state statutory 
interpretations. State governments have also become more polarized in 
recent years, but at least in states where a single party holds both 
chambers of the legislature and the governorship, “polarization need 
not slow down a unified party leadership intent on making far-reaching 
policy changes.”73 This presumably includes overrides of unwanted 
interpretations of state law. 
With respect to legislative overrides of federal statutory 
interpretations, we have more data. Most studies have focused on 
Supreme Court decisions and have sought to identify which ones have 
been overridden by Congress. The most comprehensive study, by 
Matthew Christiansen and Bill Eskridge, finds that Congress has on 
average overridden Supreme Court decisions about six times per year 
since 1967.74 Their data do not indicate what percentage of statutory 
interpretation decisions this represents. Other studies show a relatively 
low rate of statutory interpretation overrides. A comprehensive study 
of all Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions from 1969 to 
1988 revealed that 2.7 percent were overridden by Congress.75 A study 
 
 71. Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 29, at 1674.  
 72. John Dinan, Foreword: Court-Constraining Amendments and the State Constitutional 
Tradition, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 983 (2007) (noting that at the state level, “court-constraining 
amendments have been enacted for a wide range of purposes and on a regular basis throughout 
American history”).  
 73. Boris Shor, Polarization in American State Legislatures, in AMERICAN GRIDLOCK, supra 
note 10, at 220. 
 74. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 6, at 1356 tbl.2 (showing 286 overrides in forty-five 
years, or an average of just over six overrides per year). An earlier study by Eskridge, which 
covered a much shorter period (1967–1990), found a higher rate of overrides. William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 335–36, 338 
(1991).  
 75. Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to 
Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 425, 445 (1992). An older study found only 
twenty-one congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions in the 
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limited to preemption cases between 1983 and 2003 found that just 2.4 
percent were overridden or modified by Congress.76 A study of tax 
legislation found that 5.7 percent of Supreme Court tax decisions were 
overridden or modified over a fifty-year period.77 
An alternative strategy is to begin by identifying legislation that 
explicitly overrides a judicial decision. Interestingly, a sample of one 
hundred such statutes gathered by Jed Barnes (from 1976 to 1990) 
reveals that only twenty-six percent of the overrides involved Supreme 
Court decisions. The others were decisions by courts of appeals, district 
courts, the tax court, and military tribunals.78 This suggests that the 
universe of statutory overrides is roughly four times larger than 
revealed by the studies that focus only on the Supreme Court. But it 
would also seem that, for any particular court, the numbers are not 
large. As previously noted, the Christiansen & Eskridge study finds a 
notable falloff in overrides of Supreme Court interpretations since 1998; 
presumably this carries over to the larger universe of overrides as well. 
Collectively, these studies suggest that legislative overrides of statutory 
interpretation decisions are “relatively rare,”79 although they occur 
with enough frequency that interpreters are surely aware of the 
possibility. 
The Constitution, as one would expect, stands out as uniquely 
difficult to amend based on general frequency of amendment. According 
to one count, there have been eleven thousand attempts to amend the 
Constitution since 1789, of which only twenty-seven have succeeded.80 
Eleven of these amendments (including the Twenty-Seventh) were part 
of a deal to secure ratification of the original document, and ten of these 
amendments were ratified within the first two years. The balance of 
sixteen amendments works out to one amendment every fourteen years. 
Perhaps more to the point, only five amendments have been adopted to 
overturn judicial interpretations of the Constitution.81 This is one every 
 
immediate post–World War II era. Note, Congressional Reversal of Supreme Court Decisions: 
1945–1957, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1326 (1958). 
 76. Note, New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical Study of 
Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1604, 1612–
13 (2007).  
 77. Nancy C. Staudt et al., Judicial Decisions as Legislation: Congressional Oversight of 
Supreme Court Tax Cases, 1954–2005, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1340, 1354, 1384 (2007) (reviewing 279 
Supreme Court tax decisions and finding that sixteen led to “an actual override or modification”).  
 78. JED BARNES, OVERRULED? LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND CONTEMPORARY 
COURT–CONGRESS RELATIONS app. at 197–209 (2004) (my calculation is based on the description 
of overrides in the appendix).  
 79. Solimine & Walker, supra note 75, at 438.  
 80. Dixon, supra note 3, at 342. 
 81. The Eleventh Amendment overturned Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
The Fourteenth Amendment overturned Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). The 
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forty-five years. Clearly, an interpreter of the Constitution, looking at 
the empirical record, would conclude that the odds of having an 
interpretation reversed by amendment are exceedingly low. 
3. Longevity of the Specific Text in Question 
A third source of predictive data is the length of time the specific 
text in question has remained unamended. Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, which reads the same as when it was enacted over 125 years ago, 
probably has a very low probability of being amended in the future.82 
The National Labor Relations Act, originally adopted in 1935 and 
significantly amended in 1947, has defied amendment for the last 
seventy years, notwithstanding tremendous changes in American labor 
markets, including the percentage of the workforce represented by 
unions.83 There have been no significant additions to the suite of federal 
environmental statutes since 1990, more than a quarter century ago. 
At the other extreme, a more recent enactment like the Dodd-Frank Act 
presents much greater uncertainty about the likelihood of amendment. 
An interpreter would likely put a higher subjective probability of 
amendment on such an enactment because political support remains in 
flux.84 Most of the provisions of the Constitution have remained 
unchanged for nearly 230 years. What are the chances that the 
Commerce Clause or the First Amendment will be amended in the 
future? Given the failure to amend these provisions in the last 230 
years, notwithstanding the enormous social and technological changes 
that have occurred, the odds are vanishingly small. 
4. Cultural Attitudes Toward Amendment 
A fourth and more qualitative source of information consists of 
general cultural knowledge about attitudes toward amendment.85 One 
 
Sixteenth Amendment overturned Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). The 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment overturned the holding of Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), 
overruled by Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), insofar as the earlier 
case upheld the constitutionality of a poll tax on federal elections. Finally, the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment overturned Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
 82. See Oldham, supra note 4, at 349.  
 83. See Brudney, supra note 5.  
 84. The House of Representatives recently adopted a bill that would repeal or amend 
significant portions of the Dodd-Frank Act. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. 
(2017). As this Article is written, it is unclear what action the Senate will take.  
 85. See generally Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule 
Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty, 13 
INT’L J. CONST. L. 686 (2015) (arguing, based on comparative data, that “amendment culture” is 
more predictive of the rate of amendment of constitutions than is amendment difficulty); Ozan O. 
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point of contrast here is between amendments overriding statutory 
interpretation decisions and amendments overriding constitutional 
decisions. Everyone acknowledges that Congress is entitled and even 
encouraged to override statutory interpretation decisions.86 To be sure, 
congressional engagement is understood to be more intense in some 
areas than in others. For example, it is well known that congressional 
oversight of tax decisions is especially close.87 Knowing this, 
interpreters probably increase their subjective estimate of the 
probability of amendment in these areas. In contrast, other statutes, 
like the Voting Rights Act, have attained the status of “quasi-
constitutional law” or “super-statutes,”88 and are extremely difficult to 
amend, in part because of the support they enjoy from vested interests, 
but also because they have taken on the quality of moral imperatives.89 
With respect to the Constitution, a combination of attitudes 
conspires to make the prospect of amendment extremely remote. There 
has long been a view that the Constitution is the “sacred symbol of 
nationhood,”90 bequeathed to us by the all-wise and all-knowing 
founding fathers, and to which all elected officials take an oath of 
obedience. Not surprisingly, those who embrace this view are often 
hostile to the idea of amendment.91 The prospect of amendment is also 
anathema to legal elites, because it is feared it would open the door to 
amendments that would put at risk certain favored policies, such as 
abortion rights.92 In any event, all efforts to initiate the constitutional 
 
Varol, Constitutional Stickiness, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 899 (2016) (noting that history and 
constitutional starting points constrain constitutional choices across a wide variety of societies).  
 86. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Communicating and Commenting on the Court’s Work, 
83 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2125 (1995) (commenting that “[w]hen Congress is not clear, courts often invite, 
and are glad to receive, legislative correction”).  
 87. Staudt et al., supra note 77. Jed Barnes’s study of overruling statutes from 1976 to 1990 
found that twenty percent involved tax statutes. BARNES, supra note 78, at 197–209. 
 88. Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The Death 
of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389, 1394–1409 (2015).  
 89. The history of the Voting Rights Act reveals that the formula for determining covered 
jurisdictions subject to preclearance review under Section 5 remained unchanged through 
repeated reenactments—and indeed, enjoyed increasing margins of support in Congress over 
time—even after the Supreme Court had raised questions about whether it had become outdated. 
See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619–21 (2013). 
 90. Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 17 (1984); see also 
LEVINSON, supra note 12, at 22 (“[T]he belief in some kind of transcendent origin of the 
Constitution obviously contributes to according it utmost devotion.”).  
 91. MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO BY ITSELF 207, 381–82 (1987) (citing 
persons opposed to any amendment of the Constitution).  
 92. See, e.g., Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic 
Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 161 (1993) (quoting 
Thomas Foley, then Speaker of the House, as vowing, “On my watch, I’m not going to have the 
Constitution amended, if I can avoid it”); Laurence H. Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting Congress 
to Call a Constitutional Convention to Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, 10 PAC. L.J. 627, 
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amendment process have failed in recent years. There have been a few 
close calls, like the efforts to amend the Constitution to require a 
balanced budget93 and to permit flag desecration laws.94 But no 
amendment to the Constitution has been proposed and ratified in over 
forty years.95 
B. Amendability and Interpreter Behavior 
There is substantial political science literature on whether 
interpreters factor the prospect of override into their interpretive 
behavior. One school of thought, which goes by the names “separation 
of powers” theory or “strategic actor” theory, posits that interpreters 
consider the possibility of override by the enacting body. Not wishing to 
have their interpretations undone, interpreters trim their sails in light 
of their perception of the preferences of the enactor so as to minimize 
this risk.96 Another school of thought argues that the prospect of 
override is too remote to have an appreciable impact on interpreters.97 
Interpreters who sit on multimember panels (such as appeals courts) 
may anticipate the views of other individuals on the panel and will 
occasionally adjust their views in anticipation of these views.98 But they 
will not adjust their interpretive behavior in response to the presumed 
views of the enacting body. 
 
635 (1979) (stating that a constitutional convention “would inevitably pose enormous risks of 
constitutional dislocation”).  
 93. JAMES V. SATURNO & MEGAN SUZANNE LYNCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41907, A 
BALANCED BUDGET CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT: BACKGROUND AND CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS 
13–24 (2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41907.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XEB-VAR3] (detailing the 
history of congressional consideration of balanced budget amendment proposals between 1956 and 
2011).  
 94. Charles Tiefer, The Flag-Burning Controversy of 1989–1990: Congress’ Valid Role in 
Constitutional Dialogue, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 357, 377–78 (1992).  
 95. American history has witnessed other periods when many years elapsed without a 
constitutional amendment. Sixty-one years passed between 1804 and 1861 without an 
amendment, and forty-three years passed between 1870 and 1913 without an amendment. In both 
instances, the quietude ended with a burst of amending activity. See John R. Vile, American Views 
of the Constitutional Amending Process: An Intellectual History of Article V, 35 AM J. LEGAL HIST. 
44, 67 (1991). It is always possible, of course, that this pattern could repeat itself again. 
 96. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 57, at 138–57; see also LAWRENCE BAUM, THE 
PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 119–23 (1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The 
Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992).  
 97. Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1457–59 (2001); Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers 
Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28 (1997).  
 98. Modification of views in response to other participating judges on appeals courts is well 
established empirically. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory 
Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006). 
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I offer two hypotheses in response to this literature. The first is 
that whether interpreters adjust their behavior in response to the views 
of the enacting body is likely a function, at least in significant part, of 
their perception of the probability of override by the enacting body. If 
the probability of amendment is perceived to be high, interpreters will 
likely heed the current views of the enacting body. As the perceived 
probability becomes progressively more remote, the interpreter will 
give less and less thought to the current views of the enacting body. The 
second hypothesis is that if we have entered an era in which the 
probability of amendment of certain enacted texts like the Constitution 
is extremely low, the interpreter is likely to shift to a different mode of 
decisionmaking altogether. The text will effectively disappear and will 
be replaced by a form of common law incrementalism. 
To flesh these hypotheses out, I will briefly consider three 
different situations, which can be considered as approximate points 
along what is necessarily a continuum: the interpreter faced with a 
highly amendable text, the interpreter faced with a text of moderate 
amendability, and the interpreter faced with a highly unamendable 
text. 
1. Interpretation of Texts of High Amendability 
When the prospect of override by amendment is high, I 
hypothesize that interpreters will seek to conform to the current view 
of the body with the power to override their interpretations. In other 
words, the interpreter will deploy the general interpretational strategy 
developed by Einer Elhauge, who argues (on normative grounds) that 
interpreters should construe ambiguities in statutes so as to reach 
outcomes that correspond to the current enactable preferences of the 
enacting body.99 
This conjecture rests on the assumption that interpreters are 
averse to having their interpretations overridden by amendment. We 
have it on good authority that judges do not like being reversed by 
higher courts.100 There are a number of plausible reasons for this. 
 
 99. EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 
(2008).  
 100. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 141 (2008). For empirical evidence supporting 
the proposition that district court judges decide cases so as to limit the risk of reversal by the court 
of appeals, see Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric Posner, What Do Federal District Judges Want? 
An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 518 (2011). For studies 
supporting fear of reversal as a motivating factor, see Lawrence Baum, Lower-Court Response to 
Supreme Court Decisions: Reconsidering a Negative Picture, 3 JUST. SYS. J. 208 (1978); and Joseph 
L. Smith, Patterns and Consequences of Judicial Reversals: Theoretical Considerations and Data 
from a District Court, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 28, 30 (2006). For skepticism that fear of reversal plays a 
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Partly it is a matter of not wanting time and effort to go to waste. Partly 
it is a reputational concern; reversal implies professional criticism. 
Partly it is simply “amour propre” as Judge Posner puts it.101 
At least some of these reasons also apply to override by 
amendment. Certainly the desire not to have one’s work go to waste is 
equally applicable. One could argue that reversal by amendment is less 
of an implied criticism than reversal by a superior tribunal. The higher 
tribunal bases its decision on the same factors as the interpreter, 
whereas the amending body may not disagree with the interpretation 
but may simply conclude that the law should be changed. Still, no one 
likes to be repudiated, and having an interpretation overridden is likely 
to be aversive to the interpreter. 
Frank Cross and Blake Nelson argue that the evidence is “thin” 
that judges take the risk of override by Congress into account in the 
way they interpret statutes.102 But if, as other evidence suggests, the 
probability of legislative override of statutory interpretation decisions 
is generally quite low, this is as one would expect. The question is, what 
will interpreters do if the prospect of override is much higher? We know 
district court judges worry about reversal by appeals courts (which 
happens frequently),103 and it is plausible that agency interpreters 
worry about override by agency officials when agency officials can easily 
amend agency regulations. Courts may take the possibility of override 
into account in specific contexts, like tax legislation, where legislative 
oversight is intense and revision is more common.104 The assumption 
that interpreters care about the possibility of override seems reasonable 
based on our general knowledge about human behavior; absent more 
conclusive evidence that interpreters are indifferent to this risk, I will 
proceed on the premise that this assumption is valid.105 
 
“dominant” role in lower court decisionmaking, see David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of 
Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579, 600 (2003).  
 101. POSNER, supra note 100, at 70.  
 102. Cross & Nelson, supra note 97, at 1457. 
 103. See Choi et al., supra note 100 (citing rates of reversal). 
 104. Jed Barnes reports that following tax overrides, “courts strived to apply statutory 
language literally, even if adhering to the statute’s plain language produced absurd policy results.” 
BARNES, supra note 78, at 178–79. He attributes this to the nonpartisan nature of most tax 
questions, but the greater frequency of overrides in this area could also explain the judicial 
behavior. 
 105. A potential test of the assumption of aversion to override was created by Article 33 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which allows an act of parliament or a provincial 
legislature to operate “notwithstanding” a provision in the Charter’s list of fundamental freedoms. 
See generally Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Judicial Review, Legislative Override and Democracy, 38 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 451 (2003); Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: 
Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245, 275–99 
(1995). The intention was to allow legislative overrides of judicial interpretations of the Charter. 
For various reasons, however, it is generally agreed that Article 33 has not been used much to 
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As matters currently stand, the only context in which 
interpreters face a high probability of override is when the text has been 
adopted by an administrative agency, which can override an 
interpretation by issuing an interpretive rule or policy statement, or, in 
some contexts, by amending a legislative rule. It is certainly plausible 
that an agency official (such as an administrative law judge) 
interpreting an administrative text will be in a good position to know 
which interpretation is likely to conform to the wishes of current top-
level officials.106 Although the data is sparse, there is reason to believe 
that such an agency interpreter will adopt interpretations of the agency 
text that conform to the wishes of the top-level administrative 
officials.107 I am not suggesting that the interpretation will be 
completely unprincipled. Standard interpretational conventions will 
impose their constraints on the interpreter. But the agency interpreter 
will exploit the discretion inherent in being able to pick and choose 
among different canons of interpretation in order to avoid, if possible, 
override by top-level officials.108 
 
override judicial decisions; consequently, the Canadian Supreme Court does not face a prospect of 
override significantly different from that of the U.S. Supreme Court. See Erin F. Delaney, 
Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1, 54 (2016) 
(noting that “the notwithstanding power has not been used by the federal Parliament, and ‘some 
commentators discern a nascent convention that it should not be’ ” (quoting Adrian Vermeule, The 
Atrophy of Constitutional Powers, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 425 (2012))). 
 106. There are a number of differences between courts and agencies as interpreters, including 
the greater security of tenure enjoyed by federal judges relative to administrators. Perhaps more 
importantly, administrative agencies are free to communicate to legislators about pending 
interpretational questions, see Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The 
Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123 YALE L.J. 
266, 333 (2013), whereas courts regard such communications as impermissible. This surely gives 
agencies better information about the current preferences of the legislature (or at least of 
legislative committees). These and other relevant differences are outside the scope of this Article.  
 107. One study of intake decisions by state administrators under the Social Security Disability 
program finds that outcomes are influenced by knowledge of high reversal rates by the relevant 
federal administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Lael R. Keiser, Understanding Street-Level Bureaucrats’ 
Decision Making: Determining Eligibility in the Social Security Disability Program, 70 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 247, 251–52 (2010). Another study finds that ALJs rule in favor of the agency a very 
high percentage of the time (even under a restrictive definition of success). David Zaring, 
Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1172–90 (2016) (defining success as the 
SEC securing one hundred percent of the relief sought). There are a variety of explanations for 
this (most of the cases turn on factual issues). Interestingly, however, the survey finds that ALJs 
frequently cite administrative decisions in their opinions, whereas Article III district courts almost 
never cite administrative authority. Id. at 1187–88. 
 108. Arguably one should distinguish between interpreters (like ALJs) subject to internal 
review by superiors (like agency heads) and interpreters subject to external review by other 
enacting or reviewing bodies. Internal review is more like the district court/court of appeals 
relationship. Specifically, there is no evidence that interpreters like ALJs regard the possiblility 
of override by Congress any differently than courts do—which is to say no evidence that they do 
not conform to the moderate amendability hypothesis rather than the high amendability 
hypothesis. I am indebted to Jeffrey Gordon for this point.  
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It is also plausible to think that a judicial interpreter faced with 
a highly amendable administrative text will seek to avoid override. 
Indeed, any override here would be especially aggravating, since judges 
are used to reversing agencies, not the other way around. The awkward 
position of the judge asked to interpret a highly amendable agency 
regulation may explain the emergence and persistence of what is known 
as Seminole Rock or Auer deference.109 Under this doctrine, courts 
accept any reasonable agency interpretation of its own regulations. The 
agency interpretation can come from any source, including an agency 
opinion letter or amicus brief.110 Although much criticized,111 Seminole 
Rock/Auer deference directs judges to embrace the understanding of the 
regulation currently advanced by the agency that promulgated the 
regulation. In the context of a highly amendable agency text, it 
functions to eliminate a high likelihood of override.112 
2. Interpretation of Texts of Moderate Amendability 
When interpreters perceive that there is some chance of 
amendment, but the probability is low, I posit that interpreters will 
engage in “ordinary” textual interpretation. There is obviously 
considerable dispute about what constitutes ordinary interpretation.113 
Some argue that the interpreter should look primarily to the meaning 
the words would convey to a reasonable reader of the text.114 Others say 
the interpreter should resolve uncertainties by considering the intent 
 
 109. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 
410, 417 (1945).  
 110. See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 613–15 (2013) (deferring to 
interpretation in government amicus brief).  
 111. For an overview of the controversy about Seminole Rock/Auer deference, see Kevin O. 
Leske, A Rock Unturned: Justice Scalia’s (Unfinished) Crusade Against the Seminole Rock 
Deference Doctrine, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2017). The most far-reaching criticism is that the doctrine 
violates norms of separation of functions, which parallel the constitutional concept of separation 
of powers. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996).  
 112. A somewhat parallel phenomenon occurred during the period when the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory but subject to revision by the Federal Sentencing 
Commission, an administrative body. The Supreme Court announced that it would generally 
decline to resolve circuit conflicts about the meaning of the guidelines, since these conflicts could 
be eliminated by appropriate revisions by the Commission. See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 
344, 347–48 (1991).  
 113. For a general discussion of the techniques used in statutory interpretation, see, for 
example, KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION (2013); and 
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 
(2012).  
 114. See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 70 (2006). 
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or the purpose of the enactment.115 Without denying the importance of 
these disagreements, there is nevertheless a common core of consensus 
that ordinary textual interpretation seeks to determine what the 
enactment meant at the time it was enacted. Thus, the interpreter 
engaged in ordinary textual interpretation will pay close attention to 
the language of the text, the context in which that language appears, 
and various canons of interpretation, both those that reflect generalities 
about linguistic meaning and substantive canons that reflect long-
standing value judgments (such as the rule of lenity in criminal cases). 
One reason for asking what the text meant at the time it was 
enacted is that enactments of moderate amendability are likely to be 
relatively up to date. This also means, given recent trends, the text is 
likely to be rather detailed.116 Finally, it means the text will not be 
encrusted with a long history of interpretive precedent. All of which 
greatly increases the probability that the interpreter will focus on what 
the enacting body meant, rather than looking to interpretive precedent. 
The only way to resolve the question of interpretation will be by 
engaging directly with the words of the text, its context, and canons of 
interpretation in resolving questions about the meaning of the text. 
In cases of moderate amendability, the interpreter will also have 
increased confidence about resolving questions using ordinary norms of 
textual interpretation. The perception that the enacting body is 
engaged, at least to a degree, in a back-and-forth process with the 
interpreter will reinforce the interpreter’s understanding that its role 
is to engage in good faith interpretation of what the enacting body 
decided. If the enacting body, in its present or future incarnation, 
disagrees with the outcome, it has the capacity to adopt a corrective 
amendment. The interpreter’s awareness of the potential for override, 
even if the odds are low in any particular instance, is thus liberating. 
On the one hand, the interpreter need not worry about the current 
views of the enacting body—the probability of override in any particular 
case is not great. On the other hand, the interpreter need not worry that 
it will bear ultimate responsibility for whatever outcome is reached. 
Because of the potential for revision by the enacting body, responsibility 
 
 115. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 117 (2009). 
 116. For the growth of the use of complex and detailed omnibus statutes by Congress, see 
generally Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
725, 760–61 (2014). 
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for the policy can legitimately be attributed to the enactor, not the 
interpreter.117 
The upshot is that in cases of moderate amendability, the 
interpreter, while exercising a significant measure of freedom in 
pursuing its own conceptions of sound interpretation, will attempt to 
act as the faithful agent of the original enacting body.118 This is 
probably the situation that prevails with respect to judicial 
interpretation of tax statutes, criminal statutes, bankruptcy laws, and 
other statutory regimes where there has been (at least until recently) a 
small but significant level of legislative override of judicial 
interpretations. 
There is some evidence, admittedly anecdotal, suggesting that 
this is in fact the pattern we perceive. Consider in particular judicial 
interpretations of federal criminal statutes. As commentators have 
observed, a pattern emerged in the 1980s and 1990s in which federal 
courts, including the Supreme Court, adopted narrowing 
interpretations of federal criminal statutes.119 Often these narrowing 
interpretations were justified in part by the rule of lenity.120 The 
Department of Justice, during this period, actively monitored such 
decisions. When the Department identified decisions that it regarded 
as unduly constraining prosecutorial discretion, it would consult with 
the Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate, proposing language 
that would override these decisions. The Judiciary Committees, 
reflecting a general public attitude of hostility toward crime and 
accused criminals,121 on multiple occasions added language to criminal 
 
 117. This explains why a significant number of Supreme Court decisions applying what I have 
called ordinary textual interpretation include invitations to Congress to override the 
interpretation reached by the Court. For examples and discussion of their significance, see Lori 
Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of Supreme Court 
Motivations in Statutory Interpretation, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162 (1999); and Pablo T. Spiller & 
Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations to Override: Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions, 
16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 503 (1996). 
 118. Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1565 (2010) (characterizing both textualism and originalism as modes of “faithful 
agent” interpretation); see also, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., On Viewing Courts as Junior Partners 
of Congress in Statutory Interpretation Cases: An Essay Celebrating the Scholarship of Daniel J. 
Meltzer, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1743 (2016) (characterizing the normal role of the interpreter in 
statutory cases as serving as the “junior partner” of the enacting body).  
 119. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 6, at 1333–40, 1361; Daniel C. Richman, Federal 
Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 764 
(1999). 
 120. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 6, at 1324. 
 121. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 731 (2005): 
[T]he public has expressed a relatively high level of concern with crime and sentencing, 
which creates pressure on elected officials to stay on top of sentencing developments. 
Elected officials therefore have an incentive either to engage in “police patrol” oversight, 
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law reform legislation overriding decisions identified by the Justice 
Department as unduly constraining. What emerged was a pattern in 
which some but by no means all Supreme Court decisions narrowly 
interpreting federal criminal laws were overridden during this 
period.122 
What is striking about the back-and-forth between the Congress 
and the Court on criminal law during this period is that there is no 
evidence the Court changed its interpretational approach in response 
to override. The Court continued episodically to render narrowing 
interpretations of criminal statutes.123 Justices committed to the rule of 
lenity continued to invoke the rule of lenity.124 There was no suggestion 
in the overriding legislation that Congress regarded the Court as 
having acted improperly in interpreting the statutes in the way it did. 
Nor is there any suggestion in the Court’s opinions that it regarded the 
overriding amendments as a signal of displeasure on the part of the 
Congress. If anything, the moderate level of amending activity seemed 
to reinforce the Court’s confidence that its job is to interpret the 
criminal laws in accordance with its best reading of the text and its 
conception of sound interpretational principles. It could do so, secure in 
the knowledge that if the resulting interpretations were deeply 
unsatisfactory to the political branches, the statutes would be amended. 
In short, a moderate degree of amendability seemingly increases the 
confidence of the interpreter to do its job, without succumbing to excess 
 
or to pay attention to the “fire alarms” raised by the press and public when sentences 
are perceived as too lenient or a crime problem appears to be getting worse. 
 122. For example, see Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995), modified by the False 
Statements of Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-292 § 2, 110 Stat. 3459; Ratzlaf v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994), overridden by the Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994, Pub. 
L. No. 103-325, tit. IV, § 411, 108 Stat. 2160, 2243, 2253 (amendment to 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a)); 
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), which applied the rule of lenity to interpret a 
statute in favor of the defendant and was overridden by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181; and United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1077 (1st Cir. 1997), 
which narrowly interpreted coverage of the mail fraud statute and was modified by the Taxpayer 
Browsing Protection Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-35, 111 Stat. 1104. 
 123. E.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008), superseded by statute, Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617.  
 124. For recent Supreme Court decisions invoking the rule of lenity, see Yates v. United States, 
135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088–89 (2015), where the plurality opinion by Justice Ginsburg narrowly 
interpreted a criminal provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by invoking the rule of lenity; Abramski 
v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2280 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Burrage v. United States, 134 
S. Ct. 881, 891 (2014), which declined to adopt the government’s permissive interpretation of 
“result from” based, in part, on the rule of lenity; Robers v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1854, 1859 
(2014), which held the rule of lenity inapplicable to the facts of the case, but noted that there are 
circumstances where it is applicable; and United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1416 (2014), 
which held the same. But see Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 892 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (disagreeing 
with the majority’s use of the rule of lenity); Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720, 2730 (2014) 
(Alito, J., concurring) (concurring in the opinion, but also arguing that the Court could have 
reached the same decision by applying the rule of lenity).  
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concern about the current preferences of the enacting body—or to high 
levels of anxiety about making irreversible errors. 
3. Interpretation of Highly Unamendable Texts 
What if the text is perceived to be highly unamendable? One 
might think that as the risk of override disappears, interpreters will 
simply write their policy preferences into the law. This is the vision of 
interpretation propounded by the so-called attitudinal school of political 
science.125 There is extensive and growing empirical evidence that 
ideological preferences do account for much of the variance in voting on 
the Supreme Court—and on the courts of appeals as well.126 But a more 
sophisticated consideration of the situation of the interpreter suggests 
that this is not realistic for most interpreters. Nor is it realistic for the 
Supreme Court. 
The general pattern we perceive in the interpretation of 
unamendable texts is that, over time, interpretation of the text is 
gradually displaced by interpretation of precedent interpreting the text. 
After enough precedent accumulates, the process resembles 
incremental common law development rather than ordinary textual 
interpretation. There are some obvious reasons for this. As the 
precedent piles up and the text recedes into the past, the precedent 
provides a body of authority that is much more on point and accessible 
than the original understanding of the text. For example, if one wants 
to know whether the examination of an automobile or its contents by 
the police is a “search” subject to the Fourth Amendment, the many 
decisions of the Supreme Court on this topic provide much better 
guidance than asking what the founding generation understood by the 
word “search” in 1791.127 
 
 125. E.g., SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD J. SPAETH, STARE INDECISIS: THE ALTERATION OF 
PRECEDENT ON THE SUPREME COURT, 1946–1992 (1995); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). 
 126. For a recent comprehensive study see LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES: A THEORETICAL & EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 101–51 (2013), which found a 
substantial ideological effect on Supreme Court decisions; and id. at 153–99, which similarly found 
significant ideological influence on court of appeals decisions, although less than in the Supreme 
Court. See generally, Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A 
Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 243 (1999) (aggregating results of 140 research papers to find 
that the political party appointing judges explains between thirty-one and forty-eight percent of 
the variance in voting behavior). 
 127. For an overview of the extensive precedent on automobile searches, see Rachael Roseman, 
When Autonomous Vehicles Take Over the Road: Rethinking the Expansion of the Fourth 
Amendment in a Technology-Driven World, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 16–32 (2013). Efforts to 
extract guidance from originalist sources are apt to generate principles at considerable variance 
from current law. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 757 (1994).  
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The reasons for turning to precedent run deeper, however. The 
basic problem of an interpreter faced with an unamendable text is that 
the interpreter can no longer draw on its interaction with the enacting 
body as a source of legitimacy for its efforts. When interpreters construe 
texts that are unamendable, there is no back-and-forth with the 
enacting body, and thus the interpreter cannot draw upon the 
legitimacy associated with the enacting body’s active participation in 
generating legal norms. The interpreter construing an unamendable 
text thus faces a potential challenge to its legitimacy not present when 
interpreting an even moderately amendable text. How can the 
interpreter convince the relevant audience or audiences that its 
interpretation should be obeyed when the silence of the enacting body 
is likely a function of the unamendability of the text rather than its 
instructions to the interpreter?128 The answer, it seems, is that the 
interpreter will rely on precedent. At least in legal regimes with a 
common law heritage, decision according to precedent is regarded as a 
legitimate form of adjudication.129 The interpreter can maintain its 
authority to act, when the signals from the enacting body blink out, by 
shifting to the mode of common law adjudication. 
When an administrative interpreter encounters a highly 
unamendable text, it is most likely going to be a statute or a 
constitutional provision. There may be a small number of agency 
regulations or adjudicatory decisions that have been on the books a very 
long time and have been repeatedly enforced by courts, making it 
difficult for the agency to consider amending them.130 In any event, 
given that the text is unamendable, legislative override is no longer a 
concern. What the agency has to worry about is judicial reversal. 
 
 128. Legitimacy will be a concern even if the interpreter enjoys life tenure or some other strong 
form of job security. Formal independence does not automatically translate into institutional 
authority. If the interpreter renders decisions that defy the expectations of its relevant audience 
or audiences, the interpreter will be subject to criticism and potentially even defiance. Loss of 
support from the relevant audiences may translate into diminished support from the political 
branches. And the interpreter will be dependent on the support of the political branches for 
funding, staff support, and enforcement of its orders. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, 
Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
962, 984–86 (2002).  
 129. See, e.g., RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF 
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 56 (1961) (exploring the role of precedent in justifying judicial 
decisionmaking).  
 130. Rule 10b-5 in the securities law context might be an example. See Employment of 
Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016); cf. Joseph A. Grundfest, 
Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s 
Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 965 (1994) (arguing for agency amendment of 10b-5 and 
challenging the widespread view that “[t]he implied Rule 10b-5 private right, which the Supreme 
Court has frequently reaffirmed, is . . . an immutable fixture of the securities law landscape, 
changeable, if at all, only by Congress”).  
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If interpretation of the unamendable text is reviewable by the 
courts, an agency interpreter will probably be drawn to extrapolating 
from judicial precedent in resolving any ambiguity. Since the courts will 
probably have the last word in interpreting the unamendable text, the 
agency interpreter, to avoid reversal, will attempt to anticipate the 
judicial interpretation, and judicial precedent is the best source of data 
for doing this. This analysis suggests that, notwithstanding the 
Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Brand X,131 agencies will be 
reluctant to contradict judicial interpretations, at least where an 
unamendable text is involved. 
Judicial interpretation of an unamendable text depends on 
whether we are speaking of lower courts or the Supreme Court. Lower 
courts will behave like administrative interpreters in resolving 
ambiguities in unamendable texts. Since the issue will ultimately be 
resolved (if an appeal is pursued) by a higher court, the lower court will 
attempt to anticipate the preferences of the higher court, most typically 
by extrapolating from higher court precedent.132 So lower courts will 
also respond to unamendable texts by following or extrapolating from 
precedent. 
The Supreme Court presents the most interesting situation in 
interpreting unamendable texts. One might assume the Supreme Court 
would simply interpret the unamendable text so as to advance its own 
policy preferences. It is clear, however, that ideology does not explain 
everything the Court does.133 The Court, when confronted with an 
unamendable text like the Constitution, does not simply announce a 
normative preference and then interpret the text so as to maximize this 
normative goal. Instead, the process of interpretation is considerably 
more constrained. One source of constraint emphasized by many 
writers is fear of retaliation in a variety of forms short of override by 
 
 131. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) 
(holding that agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes eligible for deference under Chevron 
displace previous judicial interpretations). A more recent decision declined to apply Brand X to an 
interpretation of the Treasury Department overriding one of the Court’s own precedents 
construing the tax code, suggesting that the Justices’ support for the idea of allowing agencies to 
overrule its own interpretations is shaky. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 
U.S. 478, 486–90 (2012). 
 132. See Choi et al., supra note 100 (examining federal appellate court affirmance trends and 
hypothesizing that the lower court judges write opinions to try to maximize affirmance rates). 
 133. See, e.g., Joshua B. Fischman & Tonja Jacobi, The Second Dimension of the Supreme 
Court, 57 WM & MARY L. REV. 1671 (2015) (developing evidence that the Justices divide on 
jurisprudential as well as ideological preferences); Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature 
of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1992) (presenting evidence that the 
Court is partially constrained by legal sources). For experimental evidence that judges are more 
capable of adhering to legal constraints than are nonjudicial actors, see Dan M. Kahan et al., 
“Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and 
Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349 (2016).  
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amendment—professional criticism, threats to curtail jurisdiction, 
threats to cut budgets or deny raises, or public protest.134 
Another, and probably more important, source of constraint is 
the Court’s understanding that its ability to influence other actors to 
conform to its judgments is grounded in the perceived legitimacy of its 
behavior. Like other courts, the Supreme Court’s legitimacy ultimately 
rests on the perception that its decisions are grounded in law.135 Only 
by reaching results that appear to be grounded in law can the Court 
ensure that lower courts, agencies, and other actors will perceive its 
interpretations as legitimate, and will follow them.136 
How does all this translate into modes of interpretation? Where 
the text is vague and there is no prospect of amendment, as in much of 
constitutional law, the Supreme Court will give pride of place to its own 
precedents in order to cultivate an appearance of legality and reinforce 
its reputation for adherence to its own prior judgments.137 For the most 
part, judicial precedent in effect becomes “the constitution.”138 This 
sharply constrains the Court’s freedom to pursue its policy preferences. 
In effect, nearly every decision must be capable of being reconciled with 
the Court’s growing body of precedent, which will greatly limit the 
 
 134. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 37 (describing the influence of the relationship between the 
Supreme Court and the American public on Supreme Court decisionmaking); Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1833 (2005) (“Justices who defy 
aroused public opinion risk, and know that they risk, provoking a political backlash that ultimately 
could cause their doctrinal handiwork to collapse.”). 
 135. Martin Shapiro, Courts of Law, Courts of Politics, in COURTS AND THE POLITICAL 
PROCESS: JACK W. PELTASON’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 101 (Austin Ranney ed., 
1996); see also MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 28–36 (1981) 
(exploring the role and rationalization of courts as lawmakers). The Court has acknowledged as 
much. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (plurality opinion) 
(observing that the Court’s legitimacy is “a product of substance and perception” that it is a court 
of law). 
 136. See Editorial, The Supreme Court as Partisan Tool, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2017, at A22 
(observing that “[w]hat matters is that Americans believe they are governed by law, not by 
whatever political party manages to stack the Supreme Court”).  
 137. As my colleague Henry Monaghan has argued, if the Supreme Court does not take its own 
precedent seriously, eventually the rest of society will not either. Henry P. Monaghan, Taking 
Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REV. 1 (1979). 
 138. See STRAUSS, supra note 13, at 33 (“Pick up a Supreme Court opinion in a constitutional 
case, at random. . . . [T]he text of the Constitution will play, at most, a ceremonial role. Most of the 
real work will be done by the Court’s analysis of its previous decisions.”); David L. Shapiro, The 
Role of Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An Introspection, 86 TEX. L. REV. 929, 934–35 
(2008) (describing how precedent plays “a vital rule in the evolution of constitutional doctrine”). A 
more quantitative study, although somewhat dated, indicates that more than eighty percent of the 
authorities relied upon by some of the Justices are precedents. Glenn A. Phelps & John B. Gates, 
The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive Theory in the Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 
31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567, 594 (1991). 
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options.139 Still, as any Supreme Court advocate will tell you, in the 
sharply contested cases (such as those that divide the lower courts) it is 
usually possible to reach a relatively more liberal or relatively more 
conservative outcome, each appropriately rationalized in terms of 
precedent. And indeed, we have seen in recent years that cases of high 
political salience tend to be resolved 5-4, with a liberal block of Justices 
endorsing relatively liberal results, a conservative block of Justices 
endorsing relatively conservative results, and Justice Anthony 
Kennedy swinging back and forth from one block to another to form a 
majority.140 
There are relatively few empirical studies examining how 
interpretation is affected by a large accumulation of precedent, but such 
studies as exist are largely consistent with these conclusions.141 One 
study, by Stefanie Lindquist and Frank Cross, focuses on the federal 
courts of appeals. They suggest that the development of precedent 
initially has a constraining effect on judges, but as precedent 
accumulates (and the text remains unamended), ideological preferences 
become more prominent.142 The explanation they offer is that “the 
proliferation of available prior decisions . . . expands judges’ discretion 
to decide cases in accordance with their attitudes simply because they 
have more precedents from which to choose.”143 
A more recent study, by Lawrence Solan, involves a careful 
tabulation of citations to precedent in contested statutory 
interpretation decisions by the Supreme Court.144 He finds little overlap 
in the precedents cited by the Justices in their dueling opinions. 
Instead, opinion writers cite and quote from prior opinions that support 
the result they wish to reach and largely ignore contrary authority. The 
author ruefully notes that “[t]hese cases show relative uniformity in 
 
 139. On the path-dependent nature of common law systems more generally, see Oona A. 
Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common 
Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001). 
 140. See Devins & Baum, supra note 14 (detailing the historical developments of the Supreme 
Court that culminated in its current partisan divide).  
 141. Two large-scale studies show a strong correlation between judicial ideology and citations 
of precedent. See Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Friendly Precedent, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1789, 1819 (2015) (finding that “the ideological composition of federal appellate panels—whether 
a Democratic or Republican President appointed members of the panel—powerfully predicts the 
type of precedent they include in their opinions”); Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Judicial 
Disharmony: A Study of Dissent, 42 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 60, 61 (2015) (finding that on divided 
appeals panels “[p]recedents that are cited only by the majority are strongly correlated with the 
ideology of the majority judge; precedents that are cited only by the dissent are strongly correlated 
with the ideology of the dissenting judge”). 
 142. Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel 
Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1204 (2005). 
 143. Id.  
 144. Lawrence M. Solan, Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1165 (2016). 
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placing precedent above serious inquiry into legislative intent as a 
value in statutory interpretation.”145 
Two comments about the implications of these studies before we 
move on. First, they do not establish that interpreters engage in 
conscious manipulation of precedents in justifying their decisions. All 
they show is that a proliferation of precedent tends to increase 
discretion, and interpreters will use this discretion to reach results 
consistent with their ideological priors. In doing so, it is entirely 
conceivable that interpreters sincerely believe the precedent that 
supports their preferred result is “better reasoned” or more “on point” 
than contrary precedent. 
Second, these studies do not call into question the proposition 
that heavy reliance on precedent in interpretation is highly 
constraining, in the sense that early or key precedents set the law down 
a path that is very difficult to reverse. What they suggest is that as 
precedent accumulates, interpreters have increasing discretion to make 
small-scale adjustments in the law, and that they will do so in ways 
that are strongly influenced by their policy preferences. Interpretation 
of highly unamendable texts thus yields a world in which fundamental 
course corrections in the law are nearly impossible, while minor 
adjustments are achieved in ways that appear increasingly to be driven 
by political rather than legal values. Interpreters disguise this through 
extensive citation of precedent, but the close correlation between 
outcomes and partisan affiliation is increasingly hard to ignore—and 
poses a potentially serious challenge to the legitimacy of the 
interpretive enterprise. 
III. INTERPRETING THE UNAMENDABLE: NORMATIVE THEORY 
As a normative matter, the best solution to the growing 
unamendability of foundational U.S. law would be to lower the 
procedural barriers to amendment, making what are now unamendable 
texts more amendable. In some contexts, such as reducing the 
opportunities for filibustering in the Senate, institutional reform that 
lowers the barriers to amendment may be possible and would be 
desirable. With respect to the Constitution, however, it is presumably 
impossible to lower the barriers to amendment because the procedures 
for amending a text are themselves unamendable. What then, if 
anything, can interpreters do to reduce the disadvantages associated 
with unamendable texts? 
 
 145. Id. at 1215.  
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The most constructive thing interpreters can do is to adopt a 
strategy analogous to what the Europeans call subsidiarity.146 The 
principle of subsidiarity requires that centralized institutions refrain 
from regulating problems that can be competently regulated by more 
decentralized institutions. My suggestion is that interpreters should 
refrain from resolving disputes in accordance with highly unamendable 
texts if a relatively more amendable text is available to resolve the 
controversy. I do not suggest that the locus of legal authority can or 
should always be pushed toward maximum amendability. Resolving all 
disputes in terms of policy statements issued by administrative 
agencies or presidential executive orders would sacrifice too much 
stability in return for greater amendability. And there are many issues 
in a highly interdependent world that state and local governments are 
not competent to regulate. Nevertheless, given the prospect of extreme 
unamendability that currently afflicts the Constitution and many 
framework federal statutes, a sound strategy would be to seek a general 
shift toward sources of law that are relatively more amendable. 
Such a shift toward greater amendability could be achieved in 
significant degree by Congress. For example, Congress could foreswear 
the practice of enacting highly detailed statutes that “micromanage” 
particular problems and resolve instead to delegate broad rulemaking 
authority to administrative agencies to tackle identified problems. This 
would have the effect of substituting administrative regulations 
(relatively more amendable) for statutory directives (relatively less 
amendable). Similarly, Congress could avoid federalizing areas of social 
policy that can be adequately handled by state and local governments, 
allowing these policy issues to be resolved in a relatively more 
amendable legal form. It is probably unrealistic, however, to expect 
Congress to embrace any general program of promoting greater 
amendability. The incentives run in the wrong direction: the less 
amendable the legislative enactment, the greater the credit legislators 
can claim with interest groups that favor the law or with political 
supporters who embrace the policy.147 
A more plausible strategy is to try to influence those who are 
tasked with interpreting unamendable texts. In this spirit, I will offer 
 
 146. George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European 
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 339 (1994).  
 147. Cf. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975) (developing a model based on interest-group theory 
that presumes legislators prefer outcomes of long duration). In theory, there could be a trade-off 
between the credit legislators obtain from adopting permanent statutes as opposed to the 
frequency with which they adopt statutes. But given the constraints on the volume of legislation 
Congress can produce, adopting frequent legislation is not an option.  
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two suggestions for interpreters. One is to adopt a general canon of 
interpretation favoring the resolution of disputes in the name of the 
more amendable text. The other is to interpret relatively unamendable 
texts in a Burkean, status-quo oriented fashion, in order to create 
incentives for future lawmaking to occur in relatively more amendable 
formats. 
A. The Amendability Canon 
One general strategy for interpreters is to adopt what I will call 
an “amendability canon.” Specifically, whenever a dispute can be 
resolved under either the authority of a relatively unamendable text or 
a relatively more amendable text, the more amendable text should be 
the preferred basis for decision. Thus, if a dispute can be resolved either 
under the Constitution or a federal statute, the statute would be the 
preferred basis for decision.148 If a dispute can be resolved under a 
federal statute or a federal administrative regulation, the 
administrative regulation should be the preferred basis for decision. 
And if a dispute can be resolved under federal law or state law, state 
law would be the preferred basis for decision. As with other canons of 
interpretation, the amendability canon would establish a presumption 
favoring one source of law over another, but the presumption could be 
overcome if other interpretive sources strongly support a contrary 
source. 
As stated, the amendability canon sounds like a novel idea, and 
in its broad sweep, it would be. But it is important to note that there 
are a variety of existing interpretive canons and doctrines that yield the 
same or a similar result, albeit on a more particularized scale. The main 
function of the amendability canon would be to provide a further reason 
in support of these more particularized canons, as well as a rationale 
for choosing the more amendable text in contexts where no existing 
canon supports this approach. 
With respect to constitutional questions, consider the list of 
avoidance canons enumerated by Justice Brandeis in his famous 
concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TVA.149 These include, among 
 
 148. Under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, and general principles of 
jurisprudence, there is an established hierarchy of legal authority in which the Constitution stands 
on the top, followed by federal statutes, followed by federal regulations, followed by state law, and 
so forth. Obviously, if there is a conflict, the superior source of law trumps an inferior source. The 
proposed amendability canon would only apply in cases where an inferior source of authority—and 
therefore a more amendable one—is not in conflict with superior sources.  
 149. 297 U.S. 288, 341–56 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Ashwander rejected, in a 
shareholder derivative suit, a constitutional challenge to the Tennessee Valley Authority; Justice 
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others, that (1) courts will not pass on constitutional questions unless 
absolutely necessary to the decision; (2) courts will not formulate rules 
of constitutional law broader than required to decide the precise issue 
presented; (3) courts “will not pass upon a constitutional question 
although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some 
other ground upon which the case may be disposed of”; and (4) courts 
will construe statutes, where fairly possible, so as to avoid the need to 
decide constitutional questions.150 The Court has often applied these 
canons to avoid reaching constitutional issues. For example, 
employment discrimination cases against governmental units are 
generally resolved, if possible, under Title VII rather than the Equal 
Protection Clause.151 Although Title VII is also relatively unamendable, 
it is unquestionably easier to change than Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and indeed was substantially amended in 1991 to override 
a series of Supreme Court interpretations.152 
Another striking instance of the preference for statutory and 
regulatory resolutions relative to constitutional ones is provided by the 
doctrine that has evolved to determine whether a private right of action 
for damages is available for constitutional violations. After recognizing 
an implied right of action directly under the Constitution in Bivens,153 
the Court began backtracking, noting that courts should hesitate to 
recognize such a right of action if alternative remedies are “adequate” 
or “meaningful.”154 It is now well established that direct actions under 
the Constitution are disfavored, provided some nonconstitutional 
remedy is available, even one that is not an “equally effective 
substitute.”155 Although the Court’s retrenchment from Bivens appears 
to be motivated largely by a desire to discourage excessive litigation 
against the government,156 a sounder basis would be that the 
presumption against implied constitutional remedies forces litigants to 
 
Brandeis concurred on the ground that the constitutional questions could have been avoided by 
holding that conditions for filing a derivative suit had not been met. Id. 
 150. Id. at 346–48.  
 151. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStafano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009) (“Petitioners are entitled to 
summary judgment on their Title VII claim, and we therefore need not decide the underlying 
constitutional question.”). 
 152. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C.). It is interesting that much of the 1991 Act was justified as “restoring” interpretations 
of original civil rights acts which the Supreme Court had recently sought to change. The Court, in 
other words, was accused of disturbing the legal status quo through dynamic interpretation. 
 153. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 400–02 
(1971). 
 154. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988). 
 155. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983). 
 156. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 561 (2007). 
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resolve their disputes with the government under relatively more 
amendable sources of law. 
Turning to the choice between statutory and administrative 
resolution of disputes, we also find existing doctrines that promote 
administrative sources of resolution. One very important 
understanding here is that courts will virtually never invalidate a 
delegation of authority from Congress to an administrative agency on 
the ground that the law is insufficiently specific.157 The nondelegation 
doctrine may not be dead, but it is sufficiently toothless that it allows a 
very extensive transfer of regulatory authority from the legislature to 
various administrative bodies. This course allows policy to be made in 
relatively more amendable forms. 
Another interpretational canon, which has never been 
forthrightly discussed by the Court but exerts a powerful influence on 
the law, is that congressional grants of authority to agencies to engage 
in “rulemaking” are presumed to confer authority to make substantive 
rules having the force of law.158 Although it has a dubious pedigree,159 
this doctrine obviously facilitates a large-scale transfer of legal 
authority from statutory to regulatory law. If every agency authorized 
to make “rules” can adopt substantive legislative rules, much more law 
can be generated by agencies than would be the case if a more explicit 
conferral of such authority were required. This in turn allows the center 
of lawmaking authority to shift from relatively unamendable to more 
amendable sources. 
The Chevron doctrine, which requires courts to defer to 
reasonable administrative interpretations of statutes, is a more 
familiar interpretive doctrine that also has the effect of shifting 
authority toward agencies.160 Chevron deference only applies to agency 
interpretations set forth in regulations or adjudications having the force 
of law.161 This means, however, that when agencies implement 
statutory commands in one of these formats, the authority to determine 
the meaning of the statute, when it is unclear, is given to the agency 
rather than the courts. If questions are resolved as a matter of judicial 
interpretation of statutes, this has a tendency to lock in the meaning of 
the law, since courts follow a strong rule of stare decisis in matters of 
 
 157. Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive 
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2103–09 (2004).  
 158. E.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 377–85 (1999).  
 159. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: 
The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002) (detailing the gradual emergence of the 
understanding that general rulemaking grants confer legislative rulemaking authority). 
 160. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).  
 161. United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).  
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statutory interpretation.162 Agencies, in contrast, are regarded as 
relatively more free to change their understandings of statutes, through 
appropriate rulemaking or adjudicatory formats, as long as they give 
reasons for the change. Deferring to agency interpretations therefore 
has the effect of shifting authority from the judicially construed statute 
to agency regulations and adjudications, which are inherently easier to 
amend. Chevron has been defended in terms of greater agency 
accountability (through presidential oversight) and expertise relative to 
courts. But the doctrine also has the effect of shifting the locus of legal 
authority to a more amendable source. 
Similarly, the Seminole Rock/Auer deference doctrine has the 
effect of transferring the locus of legal authority from agency 
regulations to agency policy statements and briefs. Judicial 
interpretation of agency regulations will tend to lock in the meaning of 
regulations, making change relatively costly; the agency would have to 
promulgate a new regulation. By deferring to agency interpretations of 
regulations, the meaning can change more easily, simply by 
promulgating a new agency interpretation.163 
If the choice is between some type of enacted text and common 
law, the matter is complicated. Enacted law is generally preferable, 
because it holds forth greater promise of give-and-take between the 
enacting body and the interpreter. But if the common law has not been 
superseded by enacted law and is regarded as settled, it should be 
followed pursuant to the general principle of Burkean interpretation 
discussed in the next Section. The question is particularly important in 
administrative law, where the Court has developed a number of 
doctrines that would have to be regarded as administrative common 
law, such as the Chevron doctrine and the Seminole Rock/Auer doctrine 
previously discussed. These should probably be regarded as settled, 
leaving it to Congress to modify or repudiate them. As a general matter, 
however, courts should exercise caution in creating new forms of 
administrative common law, since these doctrines generate their own 
form of second-order unamendability characteristic of common law 
 
 162. See, e.g., id. at 247–50 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that judicial interpretation of 
statutes inevitably leads to “the ossification of large portions of our statutory law”). The locus 
classicus of statutory stare decisis is Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), which declined to overrule 
precedent holding that professional baseball does not involve interstate commerce and hence is 
not covered by the antitrust laws. 
 163. Arguably too easily, as suggested by the Court’s decision carving out an exception from 
Auer deference for regulatory interpretations on which parties have relied in structuring their 
businesses. Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155–58 (2012).  
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more generally.164 At least episodically, the Court has perceived the 
wisdom of this approach.165 
With respect to state law, one current canon that embodies a 
preference for devolution of authority is the presumption against 
preemption.166 The presumption has been criticized on a variety of 
grounds.167 Nevertheless, it again illustrates how existing law includes 
interpretive conventions that mirror a more general amendability 
canon. Once we understand why a preference for amendability makes 
sense, the traditional canon appears in new light and gains new 
plausibility. Other federalism-based doctrines also have the effect of 
preserving state law in the face of federal mandates by requiring a clear 
statement from Congress before broadly written federal regulations or 
conditional spending requirements apply to states.168 These are 
typically justified in terms of preserving state sovereignty, but they also 
have the effect of preserving control by more amendable law. 
B. Burkean Interpretation of Unamendable Texts 
A second and probably more important interpretive strategy is 
to adopt a general practice of interpreting unamendable texts in a 
Burkean fashion. One might think that if a text is unlikely to be 
amended interpreters should do whatever they can to update the text 
through interpretation. In other words, unamendable texts should be 
interpreted in a “dynamic” fashion, in order to make the understanding 
of the text conform as much as possible with the aspirations and values 
of today.169 I will argue, however, that Burkean interpretation of 
 
 164. For a variety of perspectives, see John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial 
Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113 (1998); Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative 
Common Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1207 (2015); and Gillian Metzger, Foreword: Embracing Administrative 
Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293 (2012).  
 165. For decisions disapproving of administrative common law regarded as inconsistent with 
the APA, see Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015); Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 
137 (1993); and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519 (1978).  
 166. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 167. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 290 (2000) (arguing that the 
presumption is contrary to the language of the Supremacy Clause); see also Thomas W. Merrill, 
Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism Theory, and Default Rules, in FEDERAL 
PREEMPTION 166, 166–67 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) (arguing that the 
presumption ignores the need in select areas for uniform rules). For a defense of the presumption, 
see Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the 
Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 265–69.  
 168. E.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991) (clear expression of intent required 
before federal statute will be interpreted to constrain state rules regarding tenure of state judges); 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (conditions attached to federal 
grants to states must be imposed unambiguously). 
 169. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).  
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unamendable texts will do more, in the long run, to shift the locus of 
legal authority to relatively more amendable texts, and that such a shift 
is preferable to updating unamendable texts through change-promoting 
interpretation. 
1. What Is Burkean Interpretation? 
Edmund Burke was a British politician and man of letters of the 
eighteenth century.170 His thinking was complex; he supported the 
American colonists in their struggle against Britain and backed the 
demands of Asian Indians for greater regulation of the East India 
Company. But he is best known for his strong denunciation of the 
French Revolution.171 Although Burke never wrote about the 
interpretation of enacted law, his views about the French Revolution 
have been invoked as a model for how judges should go about 
interpreting a text like the Constitution. Burke thought the French 
Revolution was deeply misguided because it was based on abstract 
ideals and ignored established traditions and institutions that reflect 
an embedded wisdom which cannot be reduced to any simple formula. 
As he put it, the “private stock of reason” in each person is small, and 
“individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank 
and capital of nations and of ages.”172 
Translating Burke’s skepticism about abstract theories of 
government into an approach to legal interpretation presents a number 
of issues.173 As used here, Burkean interpretation would construe 
ambiguous or vague provisions in unamendable texts so as to preserve 
the settled meanings of those texts and any established social practices 
challenged as violating such texts. In a word, Burkean interpretation 
seeks to enforce the legal status quo.174 It tries to discover the existing 
“equilibrium” or the “institutional settlement” associated with the text, 
and to remain faithful to that understanding.175 
 
 170. For an extensive treatment of Burke’s life and thought, see CONOR CRUISE O’BRIEN, THE 
GREAT MELODY: A THEMATIC BIOGRAPHY OF EDMUND BURKE (1992).  
 171. BURKE, supra note 1.  
 172. Id. at 76.  
 173. For two especially illuminating discussions, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF 
MANY MINDS 35–121 (2009); and VERMEULE, supra note 22, at 57–122. Earlier efforts include 
Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990); Thomas W. Merrill, Bork 
v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 513 (1996); and Ernest Young, Rediscovering 
Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619 
(1994). 
 174. See Merrill, supra note 167.  
 175. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 119 (1994) (describing 
the principle of institutional settlement as accepting the “distinction between settled law and the 
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Burkean interpretation, by adopting the settled meaning of a 
text, will obviously lean heavily on precedent. In this sense it does not 
represent a radical departure from current Supreme Court practice, 
which as we have seen relies overwhelmingly on precedent in 
interpreting unamendable texts. But there is an important difference. 
The Court, in its current incarnation, views the system of interpretive 
precedent the way an aggressive post-Realist common law court regards 
the common law: as a flexible tool of interstitial lawmaking.176 
Established rules of decision are rarely disturbed, but the court regards 
itself as free to add qualifications, consistent with precedent, that either 
expand or contract the scope of the textual provision in question. The 
Burkean view of precedent, in contrast, is that precedent is evidence—
particularly important evidence—of what the law is. That precedent 
should be read the way a lawyer anxious to advise a client about the 
state of the law would read it—by trying to ascertain its fair import—
not the way an advocate would use it to advance a cause. 
Supreme Court precedent is not the sole source that should be 
consulted in trying to ascertain the settled meaning of an unamendable 
text. High court precedent should be supplemented by other types of 
evidence, including consensus among lower courts about the meaning 
of an enactment, the interpretation of other enactments containing 
similar provisions, “negotiated” understandings about the division of 
power between the political branches, and long-standing conventions or 
practices that have emerged over time and enjoy widespread 
acquiescence.177 In seeking the established meaning, the Burkean 
interpreter will want to consider a variety of sources—anything that 
sheds light on the way the legal community, explicitly or implicitly, 
understands the provision in question. This should also include 
substantive canons of interpretation (like the rule of lenity), which can 
be regarded for these purposes as distillations of conventional wisdom 
 
law-that-is-not-but-ought-to-be”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as 
Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994). 
 176. Justice Scalia provides an inimitable characterization of the common law method in 
Scalia, supra note 54, at 3–9. Specifically, Scalia characterizes the common law judge as a broken-
field runner, “distinguishing one prior case on the left, straight-arming another one on the right, 
high-stepping away from another precedent about to tackle him from the rear, until (bravo!) he 
reaches the goal—good law.” See id. at 9.  
 177. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595, 1620–
31 (2014) (interbranch consensus); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and 
the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012) (similar); Merrill, supra note 167, at 517–
18 (lower court precedent); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1163, 1181–93 (2013) (conventions). For a particularly nice account of how practice under the 
Constitution can evolve in ways unanticipated by the text, see Joel K. Goldstein, Constitutional 
Change, Originalism, and the Vice Presidency, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 369 (2013). 
Merrill_Galley(Do Not Delete) 3/7/2018  9:51 AM 
592 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2:547 
bearing on the provision in question.178 In processing the information 
provided by these sources, the Burkean assumes the role of synthesizer 
or integrator who seeks to extract the decisional rule that fits or coheres 
best with all relevant data that has accumulated over time.179 
Burkean interpretation can be contrasted to both originalism 
and dynamic interpretation. In contrast to originalism, the Burkean 
interpreter seeks to uncover the settled meaning of a text as it exists 
today, not the meaning when the text was enacted. When we speak of 
settled meaning, we refer to the meaning a text has come to have, not 
the meaning it had when it was adopted. In contrast to dynamic 
interpretation (which comes in a variety of flavors), the Burkean 
interpreter seeks to discover the settled meaning of the text, not to 
manipulate the precedents in such a way as to promote change by 
making the meaning better, more just, or more pragmatic. Thus, the 
Burkean interpreter eschews the perspective of the lawyer-as-
advocate—the brief writer—who tries to expansively interpret some 
authorities, and minimize others, in the interest of supporting the 
result desired by a particular client, cause, or political party. 
The Supreme Court has recently rendered two examples of 
Burkean interpretation, which illustrate how this approach would 
operate and provide some cause to hope that it might be adopted more 
generally. In NLRB v. Noel Canning,180 a key question was whether the 
Recess Appointments Clause181 permits the president to make 
temporary appointments only when a vacancy arises while the Senate 
is in recess, or if this power also applies to vacancies in existence when 
the Senate goes into recess. The Clause had never been interpreted by 
the Court, and its language was probably more compatible with the first 
interpretation. Justice Scalia, in an opinion for four Justices, relied 
heavily on the language of the Clause and would have limited the power 
to vacancies that arise during a recess.182 Justice Breyer, writing for the 
majority, conceded that this reading of the language was arguably more 
“natural,” but he thought the text was not conclusive either way. What 
 
 178. See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 921, 941–50 (1992) (arguing that the canons of interpretation promote continuity in the law). 
 179. A different principle of integration is reflected in Ronald Dworkin’s idea of interpretation 
as integrity. E.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). For Dworkin, the interpreter must 
make a conscientious effort to account for all previous interpretations, but in integrating these 
sources the interpreter selects the interpretation that yields the “best” meaning in the sense of the 
one that does the most to advance morality. Id. at 225–50. Burkean interpretation is essentially 
Dworkin’s method of integrity without the heavy moral gloss.  
 180. 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2567 (2014). 
 181. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that 
may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the 
End of their next Session.”). 
 182. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2606–18 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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was decisive was historical practice over the past 200 years: presidents 
had consistently interpreted the Clause to apply to preexisting 
vacancies, and the Senate had not disputed this practice for nearly 
three-quarters of a century.183 This tradition, he concluded for the 
majority, “is long enough to entitle the practice ‘to great regard in 
determining the true construction’ of the constitutional provision.”184 
Here we see Burkean interpretation in its nearly pure form. Long-
standing practice, acquiesced in by the affected departments of 
government, reveals the settled meaning of the Clause. The effect is to 
validate the legal status quo. 
Two terms later, the Court confronted the question whether the 
states, in drawing legislative districts, may use total population as a 
baseline for apportionment or must use a more restrictive measure 
based on the number of eligible voters. The petitioners in Evenwel v. 
Abbott185 argued that the more restrictive measure based on eligible 
voters was required by the Constitution. The United States, as amicus 
curiae, argued that a total population baseline was required. The Court 
rejected both positions, holding that it was permissible for Texas to use 
total population, as it had done in the matter before the Court. Writing 
for six Justices, Justice Ginsburg relied in part on constitutional 
history, in part on prior decisions, and in part on “settled practice.”186 
The history included both the provision of the original Constitution that 
based apportionment among the states on the basis of total population 
and the decision of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to do the 
same.187 Statements from past opinions could be quoted on either side, 
but Justice Ginsburg found it more significant that the Court had 
consistently evaluated state apportionment schemes based on a total 
population, rather than an eligible voter, baseline.188 Settled practice 
sealed the matter: “Adopting voter-eligible apportionment as 
constitutional command would upset a well-functioning approach to 
districting that all 50 States and countless local jurisdictions have 
followed for decades, even centuries.”189 As in Noel Canning, the effect 
was to interpret the Constitution as incorporating the status quo and 
to reject pleas to handcuff other governmental actors through novel 
readings of an unamendable text. 
 
 183. Id. at 2573 (majority opinion).  
 184. Id.  
 185. 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).  
 186. Id. at 1132. 
 187. Id. at 1127–30. 
 188. Id. at 1131. 
 189. Id. at 1132. 
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2. Why Be Burkean? 
There are multiple reasons to endorse a Burkean approach to 
interpreting unamendable texts, and it is not my objective here to 
canvas all those reasons or offer a complete defense of Burkean 
interpretation.190 Instead, in keeping with the theme of the Article, I 
offer just one: Burkean interpretation of unamendable texts should 
promote governance by means of relatively more amendable texts 
instead of unamendable texts. This is because status-quo reinforcing 
interpretation, by definition, is inhospitable to efforts to achieve 
deliberate legal change through interpretation. Burkean interpretation 
aspires to discover and enforce what the law is, not to make it better. 
Knowing this, advocates of social change will direct their energies 
elsewhere. The most promising strategy is to advocate for the adoption 
of new laws or regulations that prescribe the desired change. These new 
laws will nearly always be incorporated in relatively more amendable 
texts; at the very least they will be more amendable than the most 
highly unamendable texts, like the Constitution. Thus, the locus of 
social policy will shift “downward” from the unamendable to the 
amendable. Over time, this process will cause relatively more law to 
occupy forms that are amendable than will be the case if social change 
is achieved through interpretation of unamendable texts. 
Constitutional law is filled with examples in which the 
recognition of new rights by the courts has been frustrated by status-
quo oriented interpretation, only to be followed by the creation of 
similar (in many cases more robust) rights by way of legislation. Thus, 
the Supreme Court, reflecting a cautious interpretive approach, has 
rejected claims that discrimination against the poor, the homeless, the 
elderly, or the disabled is subject to heightened scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause.191 In response, Congress has adopted 
statutory regimes that provide significant protections for two of these 
categories of individuals, and the federal government and the states 
have jointly taken steps to address the others.192 Or, consider the 
 
 190. See Merrill, supra note 167, at 515–21 (listing as other reasons in support of Burkean 
interpretation protecting rule of law values, preserving continuity with the past, and comporting 
with skepticism about the powers of human reason). The ultimate justification for Burkean 
adjudication likely resides in a conception of courts as impartial dispute resolution tribunals. To 
resolve disputes impartially, the tribunal must apply settled law, not change the law. 
 191. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (disability); 
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (age); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (wealth); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73–74 (1972) (housing).  
 192. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2012); Equal 
Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
Education and housing have been addressed by large federal grants supplemented with state 
appropriations. Many state courts have entered judgments requiring equalization of funding 
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Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London,193 rejecting the 
claim that economic development takings violate the “public use” 
provision of the Takings Clause. The decision was firmly grounded in 
the status quo, following roughly a dozen Supreme Court precedents 
that refused to put any teeth in the public use requirement.194 Yet the 
outcome was harshly condemned, with opinion polls showing that most 
of the public disapproved of the decision.195 The result was widespread 
agitation for greater protection of property rights, which eventually 
yielded new laws in some forty-five states restricting the use of eminent 
domain.196 If, as I suspect, the more extreme of these new laws come to 
be seen as unwise, it is better that they have been adopted as state 
constitutional provisions and statutory limitations, rather than as an 
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution. The new protections against 
eminent domain embodied in state law are relatively amendable; a 
Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution would be difficult to 
dislodge. 
Another way to make the general point is in terms of the 
distinction between the “Big C” and the “little c” constitutions, as 
recently developed by Bill Eskridge and John Ferejohn.197 The Big C 
Constitution is the unamendable piece of parchment displayed under 
glass at the National Archives. It is the document whose interpretation 
is at issue in cases we identify as presenting formal claims of 
constitutional law. The little c constitution is composed of framework 
statutes and embedded practices that also prescribe the workings of 
government and the rights of citizens against the government. The Big 
C Constitution governs only a small subset of the things that 
government officials do and only a fraction of the interactions between 
the government and its citizens. Most government activity and 
interactions are governed by the little c constitution. This complex of 
legislation is supplemented by a vast body of administrative 
regulations, judicial interpretations, and informal conventions. It is, if 
you will, the American equivalent of the unwritten English 
constitution—a set of practices and norms that govern the conduct of 
 
among school districts. For an overview, see James E. Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Foreword to 
Symposium on School Finance Litigation: Emerging Trends or New Dead Ends?, 22 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 463 (2004). 
 193. 545 U.S. 469, 485 (2005).  
 194. Id. at 477–90 (citing cases).  
 195. Janice Nadler et al., Government Takings of Private Property, in PUBLIC OPINION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 286–301 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008).  
 196. Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 82, 84–85 
(2015). 
 197. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010).  
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public officials, even if not set forth in a single document and even if 
subject to continual evolution over time in response to changing 
circumstances.198 
Interpreting the Big C Constitution in a status-quo reinforcing 
fashion will tend to shrink recourse to the Big C Constitution in 
devising responses to new social problems and will correspondingly 
increase reliance on the little c constitution. This has already happened 
to a very significant extent. The fraction of social problems addressed 
by high-level unamendable texts is tiny compared to the proliferation 
of issues generated by our complex and growing society. The locus of 
governmental authority has steadily shifted from courts applying 
common law and common law constitutionalism to administrative 
agencies. Adopting a mode of interpretation that accelerates this trend 
will help reduce government by unamendable text and replace it with 
government by amendable text, which is on the whole a good thing. 
Against the incentive effects of Burkean interpretation, consider 
the alternative of originalism. Originalism, if done in a fashion truly 
faithful to the expectations of the enactors, would tend to exacerbate 
the disadvantages of unamendable texts.199 The problem of dead hand 
control would become more severe if texts adopted long ago were 
faithfully interpreted as embodying the understanding of long-dead 
enactors. And the people would become progressively more 
disenfranchised as the law that governs them recedes into the past and 
the prospect of popular participation in revising that law becomes 
increasingly remote. 
Burkean interpretation is also superior to dynamic 
interpretation in its various guises. Dynamic interpretation admittedly 
ameliorates some of the disadvantages of unamendable texts. 
Specifically, it selectively mitigates the dead hand problem. 
Interpretation of vague provisions like the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses becomes a kind of rolling constitutional convention 
composed of the current Supreme Court Justices.200 Being creatures of 
their time, the Justices who favor this approach can update the 
meanings of these texts to reflect contemporary values. Proponents of 
dynamic interpretation frequently hail its capacity to achieve a de facto 
 
 198. See A.W. BRADLEY & K.D. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 20–31 
(12th ed. 1997) (describing the unwritten rules of the English constitution).  
 199. See generally Merrill, supra note 118, at 1567–69 (characterizing originalism as a form of 
faithful agent interpretation).  
 200. President Woodrow Wilson was evidently the first to characterize the Supreme Court as 
a “constitutional convention in continuous session.” John R. Vile, American Views of the 
Constitutional Amending Process: An Intellectual History of Article V, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 44, 
57–58 (1991).  
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amendment of the text, at least the vague provisions, as a great 
virtue.201 The Court has agreed up to a point, purporting to adopt a 
more flexible approach to stare decisis in constitutional cases in order 
to facilitate judicial reinterpretation of the unamendable.202 
But dynamic interpretation does not solve the other problems 
associated with an unamendable text. It does not solve the dead hand 
problem posed by the rule-like provisions of an unamendable text. 
Because they have a clear meaning, these provisions continue to defy 
change through interpretation.203 Nor does it permit updating of 
provisions that are not justiciable, because of standing limitations or 
otherwise. Nor does dynamic interpretation yield the back-and-forth 
between enactor and interpreter associated with amendable texts, with 
its healthy potential for experimentation and revision. Nor does it solve 
the problem of excluding the people from active participation in 
determining the content of the law. Indeed, if anything, dynamic 
interpretation makes interpretation even more of an elite enterprise, 
confined to judges and lawyers—a closed circle from which ordinary 
voters are excluded. 
Dynamic interpretation is also troubling because it would likely 
be highly unstable unless leavened with a heavy dose of Burkean 
interpretation. Consider so-called pragmatic interpretation, as 
relentlessly espoused by Judge Posner.204 Interpretation of texts 
drawing on cost-benefit analysis, as urged by Judge Posner, would be 
sensitive to changes in the measurement of variables or the discovery 
of new variables. Interpretation drawing upon moral reasoning is 
similarly subject to shifting perspectives. The problem is compounded 
when we consider that different interpreters are likely to have different 
views about what kind of change to promote through interpretation. 
Burkean interpretation has a theory that collectively binds 
interpreters—they are bound by the meanings of texts that can be 
regarded as settled. Originalist interpretation has a theory that 
collectively binds interpreters—they are bound by the understanding of 
the enacting body. What is it that binds one judge or interpreter to the 
dynamic analysis carried out by another judge or interpreter? Dynamic 
interpretation is only controlling if one agrees that the analysis is 
correct. If interpreter No. 1 disagrees with a dynamic analysis rendered 
 
 201. E.g., BALKIN, supra note 19, at 277–319; STRAUSS, supra note 13, at 33–53.  
 202. E.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).  
 203. BALKIN, supra note 19, at 39–49.  
 204. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 100. For some earlier versions of Posnerian pragmatism, 
see, for example, RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 57–96 (2003); RICHARD 
A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 387–405 (1995); and RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF 
JURISPRUDENCE 454–69 (1990).  
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by interpreter No. 2—either because No. 1 has better data, or thinks 
she is smarter, or thinks her values are superior—No. 1 has no reason 
to follow the lead of No. 2. A world of dynamic interpretation undiluted 
by a significant commitment to Burkean interpretation would therefore 
be a world of continuous revisiting of past decisions, dramatic shifts in 
legal understanding with new appointments, and rampant overruling 
of prior interpretations. 
The impossibility of pure dynamic interpretation reveals that 
any project of reform-through-interpretation rests on the faith (or hope) 
that law-changing interpretations will be formulated by “good” 
interpreters, which will then be regarded as binding on other 
interpreters as a matter of Burkean practice. But of course, it is equally 
possible that innovations will be adopted by “bad” interpreters, which 
will also be regarded as binding in the future. The combination of 
dynamic interpretation today but Burkean constraint tomorrow makes 
the future of law dependent on the vagaries of the judicial appointments 
process, which is in turn a function of the outcome of elections and the 
timing of judicial resignations. If dynamic interpretation is unworkable 
if not supplemented by a large dose of Burkean interpretation, perhaps 
interpreters should be consistently Burkean.205 
A shift to Burkean interpretation would not banish discretion 
from the practice of interpretation.206 Discretion will always be present, 
especially at the level of the Supreme Court. If the result is foreordained 
by settled law, the matter will not be litigated—at least not to higher 
level appeals tribunals. But the question always remains how 
interpretive discretion is to be exercised when the matter is disputed. 
The Burkean never forgets that her ultimate task is to settle disputes 
between antagonists in a way that both can recognize as being 
consistent with existing law. The objective is not to use the case as a 
vehicle for promoting social change that the interpreter regards as 
desirable. Achieving social change is best left to the other branches and 
 
 205. Similar comments apply to originalism. Justice Scalia notoriously described himself as a 
“faint-hearted” originalist, because he was unwilling to enforce original understandings against 
interpretations of the Constitution that are settled. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862, 864 (1989). Justice Thomas’s contributions to originalism consist 
largely of separate concurring and dissenting opinions in which he suggests that issues should be 
reconsidered in future cases in light of evidence of original meaning. E.g., Kelo v. City of New 
London, 545 U.S. 469, 506 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (urging future reconsideration of “public 
use” in light of original understanding). When assigned to write for the Court, he reverts to 
standard modes of opinion writing, heavily oriented to precedent. E.g., Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 
2056 (2016) (applying Supreme Court precedent to uphold search following arrest against Fourth 
Amendment challenge). Why keep agitating for originalism if unwilling to stand behind it? 
 206. See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedent, 87 VA. L. REV. 1 
(2001) (noting that the Chevron doctrine presupposes that enactments often have multiple 
permissible meanings). 
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units of government. Put another way, the Burkean regards 
interpretation like completing a jigsaw puzzle, by finding the piece with 
the color and contour that fits into what has been laid down before. It 
is not like Scrabble, trying to add new words to the board that score the 
most points. Admittedly, it is ultimately a matter of attitude. But 
attitude matters, perhaps more than fidelity to any theory, doctrine, or 
interpretive technique. 
C. Incentive to Amend 
A final consequence of declining to seek change through 
interpretation of unamendable texts is that this would create a greater 
incentive to formally amend these texts. If we accept that all 
constitutions and framework laws must be changed to reflect changing 
economic, social, and cultural conditions, and if we assume that one 
pathway to change (interpretation) is significantly constrained by the 
normative propositions here set forth, then pressure should build to try 
to achieve change the right way—through formal amendment. Thus, an 
increased use of avoidance doctrines and a status-quo oriented 
approach to interpretation should result, at least at the margins, in an 
increase in the use of formal amendment as a vehicle for change.207 
Consider this: in 1935–36, President Franklin Roosevelt and his 
advisers gave serious thought to seeking one or more amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution to provide a legal foundation for the New Deal 
legislation that had recently been invalidated by the Supreme Court.208 
Roosevelt decided this was too risky and instead embarked on the 
Court-packing plan. We will never know for sure whether the 
amendments would have been adopted if they had been pressed by 
Roosevelt.209 But surely their chance of being approved would have been 
much higher if the Court had not “switched” in 1937 and begun 
approving the New Deal innovations under a revised interpretation of 
the Constitution. The decisions by the President and the Justices 
during this fateful period set us down our present path, where 
constitutional change is achieved not by amendment, but by appointing 
new Justices to the Court. In a period of political and geographic 
polarization, it is not clear that we can get back to a better path, 
 
 207. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 92, at 157 (developing the argument that “at the 
margin,” expansive interpretation of the Constitution “deters constitutional amendment through 
Article V”). 
 208. For a recent account, see JAMES F. SIMON, FDR AND CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES 268–69, 283–
91, 294, 306–12 (2012).  
 209. For evidence that Roosevelt could have obtained one or more amendments had he sought 
them, see DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 
1776–1995, at 305, 314 (1996).  
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although the odds would go up a bit if the Court would forswear 
amendment-by-interpretation. 
In the end, I am skeptical for several reasons that the normative 
approach to interpretation I have outlined would result in a significant 
increase in the rate of formal amendments of the Constitution and other 
framework statutes. The structural impediments to amendment, 
including the limited capacities of top-tier institutions and increasing 
political and geographic polarization, combined with the cultural 
hostility to tinkering with venerable texts, create a strong headwind 
against formal amendment. The proposition that judicial resistance to 
innovation will induce democratic institutions to innovate bears a 
resemblance to the claim that courts should always enforce the literal 
meaning of a text in order to create an incentive for enactors to be more 
careful in drafting.210 Even with a discernible rise in this kind of 
“textualist” approach to statutory interpretation, there is little evidence 
that Congress has responded by expanding the use of staff that might 
be able to assure more careful drafting. A more likely response to the 
approach I have outlined would be a shift from seeking change through 
interpretation of the Constitution and other unamendable texts to 
seeking change through more amendable sources of law. But an 
increase in the rate of amendment should not be entirely ruled out and 
would be a welcome development. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States has operated under the same written 
Constitution longer than any other democratic government. The 
longevity of the U.S. Constitution is often celebrated, but it is also a 
great puzzle. Comparative studies examining other nations, as well as 
the fifty states in the U.S. that also operate under written constitutions, 
suggest that a framework law as difficult to amend as the U.S. 
Constitution should have been tossed aside long ago. How is it possible 
that this one has endured? 
My explanation is along the following lines. The U.S. 
Constitution is for the most part a sparse, skeletal document, designed 
to establish a national government of minimal powers. Even in its 
original, minimalist form, the Constitution contemplated that most of 
the operating institutions of the national government would be 
established by legislation adopted by Congress. Over the years, 
 
 210. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2505–06 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing 
the Court’s refusal to enforce the plain meaning of the text of the Affordable Care Act “encourages 
congressional lassitude”).  
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especially in the twentieth century, Congress has used its legislative 
powers to create an enormous federal governmental apparatus, 
including entities like the Federal Reserve Board and the 
Environmental Protection Agency that would have astonished the 
founding generation. The Supreme Court has abetted the process by 
interpreting select clauses of the Constitution, such as the power to 
regulate commerce among the states, in an extremely expansive 
fashion, while interpreting other clauses, which might be read as 
protecting private economic rights, more narrowly.211 The upshot is that 
Congress has been allowed to establish, by legislation, a little c 
constitution that dwarfs the Big C Constitution in its significance. The 
little c constitution, which depends on legislation for its source of 
authority and is often implemented by administrative regulation, is 
necessarily much more amendable and therefore more adaptive than 
the Big C Constitution. The Big C Constitution continues to dictate the 
basic structure of the top-tier institutions of the national government—
the two Houses of Congress, the separately chosen president, the 
independent judiciary—all of which remains unamendable.212 But 
below the top tier, the little c constitution reigns supreme, and has been 
endowed with enough flexibility to allow the overall system to survive. 
The original text endures as an object of veneration that helps hold the 
country together; meanwhile, most of the actual structure and function 
of government is determined by an unwritten constitution that 
continually evolves.213 
The basic point I wish to make is that we should not 
complacently assume this elaborate “workaround” will continue to 
function well in the years ahead.214 As Stephen Griffin has written, “the 
difficulty of amendment may be one of the most serious political 
problems facing the United States as the Constitution enters it[s] third 
century.”215 The problem is compounded by political and cultural 
factors, including political and geographic polarization and veneration 
 
 211. For the details, see, for example, DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME 
COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY 1888–1986, at 205–73 (1990).  
 212. Cf. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the 
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984) (arguing that the “apex” of our federal government 
is subject to the limits of the written constitution but that agencies operating below the apex are 
not).  
 213. Cf. ELKINS ET AL., supra note 28, at 20 (“One of the reasons that the U.S. Constitution 
works (legitimate critiques notwithstanding) is that political life has grown around it and adapted 
to its idiosyncratic edicts.”). 
 214. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499 (2009) (describing 
workarounds to achieve politically popular goals that are prohibited by the Constitution’s 
provisions).  
 215. Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States: From Theory to Politics, in 
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 29, at 37, 52.  
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of the Constitution as a sacred secular text, which combine to make the 
prospect of amendment dimmer today than ever before. And similar 
political and cultural factors make amendment of framework laws 
establishing the little c constitution increasingly problematic as well. 
Nor should one assume that dynamic interpretation of 
unamendable texts is the solution to this problem. As a predictive 
matter, interpreters will not generally respond to unamendable texts 
by assuming the mantle of change-promoting interpretation. If 
anything, the isolation of interpreters from healthy back-and-forth with 
enactors is likely to introduce its own rigidity, in the form of slavish 
devotion to precedent and caution about promoting change that cannot 
be easily reversed. Rather than urging interpreters to promote change, 
a better solution is to urge them to adopt the amendability canon and 
to be consistently Burkean, at least when confronted with a highly 
unamendable text. This will tend to channel the forces demanding legal 
change into texts which are necessarily more amendable, and hence less 
subject to the pathologies associated with unamendable texts. 
